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INTRODUCTION 
Indifferent might have once best described the response of 
business owners upon hearing about the National Security Agency 
(NSA), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),1 or the 
Department of Justice’s “National Security Letter[s]” (NSLs).2 If 
questioned about FISA, or NSLs, the majority of business leaders 
and their attorneys would have acknowledged a lack of familiarity 
with these chapters in the annals of federal legislation, and 
historically, little reason existed for them to have even the briefest 
exposure to this body of law.3 It is doubtful that either of these 
security tools associated with foreign-intelligence surveillance and 
the prevention of terrorist activity would have alerted further inquiry 
by the commercial sector, even had they garnered the attention of a 
business owner or her counsel.4 Consequently, a meager few of the 
country’s business leaders or their legal counsel were apt to include 
NSA surveillance, FISA, or NSLs in the company’s cache of 
considerations when contemplating potential risks and exposure.5
As is true of most aspects of American government, September 
11, 2001 changed things, and domestic surveillance is no exception.6
FISA, NSLs, business-records requests, and other NSA surveillance 
in the name of national security are all matters now quite relevant to 
the American business owner.7 In fact, FISA’s broad, unfettered 
application since 9/11 and Congress’s expansive amendments to it 
suggest a new and amplified dedication is warranted that entreats 
businesses to engage in a focused examination of this law and its 
prescription for, not proscription of, surreptitious surveillance of 
domestic commercial activities.8 Likewise, NSLs are a second 
governmental power, similar to FISA’s business-records requests, 
that were significantly enlarged with the adoption of the USA 
1. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885c (2012).
2. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2709, 3511(d)(1) (2012). 
3. See infra Part IV.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See infra Section II.D.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Section IV.A.
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PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act)9 and are of new import to businesses.10
The statutory expansion of NSL authority enables the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) and other federal agencies to issue “demand 
letters” with no court oversight directing commercial recipients to 
provide information that may include a host of customer-specific 
information and more.11 Some reports indicate that since the 
enactment of the Patriot Act there have been more than 140,000 NSL 
applications, involving more than 50,000 United States persons.12
Together, FISA, including its business-records requests, and NSLs 
punctuate an acute need for increased awareness of the possible 
business implications of these national-security laws.
Need, however, escalates to something much more akin to 
demand when today’s business interactions are viewed through the 
lens of the network theory “small-world” problem.13 Information 
accumulated through NSA surveillance, FISA, and NSLs 
dramatically multiplies how much information the government 
knows about domestic businesses, business owners, their customers 
and clients, their interactions, and the networks they create.14
Conversely, the businesses themselves may be unaware of much of 
what the government knows, and more particularly, the businesses
most likely lack any meaningful knowledge of the far-reaching 
effects of their surface interactions and the networks those 
interactions generate. Business networks are of great interest to the 
government’s national-security concerns and squarely within their 
monitoring objectives.15 Business owners, however, have been 
largely unaware of the government’s efforts and oblivious of the 
heightened potential for unintended consequences wrought by their 
businesses’ invisible network of acquaintances, colleagues, and
friends.
If Stanley Milgram is correct, the average network of 
acquaintances that connect any of us numbers no more than six.16
Hardly any of us, however, are cognizant of the numerous networks 
9. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 201-25, 115 Stat. 272, 
278-96 (2001).
10. See infra Section IV.B.
11. See infra notes 452-68 and accompanying text.
12. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders 1979-2014,
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER (May 1, 2014), 
http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html.
13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra Part I; see also infra Part V.
15. See infra Part I.
16. See infra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
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we create or of which we may be a member.17 More particularly, we 
also do not know exactly who is included within our networks.18
Notwithstanding our own lack of awareness and, perhaps, interest, 
the networks created through our acquaintance links are receiving a 
great deal of scholarly attention, and in the wake of 9/11, scholars 
are not alone.19 The nation’s executive branch, inclusive of federal 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies, has developed a 
particularly heightened curiosity in our networks and has evidenced 
an intensified attentiveness.20
Shortly following the twelfth anniversary of September 11, 
2001, this Article examines the implications of the terrorists’ attacks 
for American business owners by considering federal domestic-
surveillance strategies in light of Milgram’s small-world theory and 
the associated concept of “six degrees of separation.”21 In many 
respects, the focus is one of risk management, and this Article 
presents potential new hazards posed by contemporary business 
interactions, given the latitude FISA and NSLs confer upon 
American law enforcement agencies.
This Article proposes that the invisible social networks created 
by employees and business owners may inadvertently position a 
business and its principals as federal-surveillance targets and the 
subjects of permissible surreptitious wiretapping, eavesdropping, and 
“sneak and peek” searches.22 In addition to increased surveillance, 
business owners and businesses are more prone than ever to receive 
federal warrantless requests for sensitive information about 
employees, clients, and customers. Because the legislation does not 
require disclosure, the business principals who become surveillance 
targets may never know or learn of the government’s monitoring of 
telephone calls and electronic data.23 Further, should a business 
receive NSL requests for information, not only must the business 
17. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Section II.D.
20. See infra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 29.
22. A sneak and peak search is a surreptitious entry search that allows 
“officers to secretly enter, either physically or virtually; conduct a search, observe, 
take measurements, conduct examinations, smell, take pictures, copy documents, 
download or transmit computer files, and the like; and depart without taking any 
tangible evidence or leaving notice of their presence.” CHARLES DOYLE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL31377, THE USA PATRIOT ACT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 62-63
(2002).
23. See infra note 452.
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comply, but the NSL gagging provision also forbids recipients from 
disclosing to anyone other than their attorney the government’s 
demand for records.24 Further still, an employee who becomes the 
recipient of an NSL request for business records may also be 
prohibited from revealing the government’s request—even to her 
superiors or the business’s owners.25
In many ways, post-9/11 national-security efforts are viewed as 
contributing to the creation of a climate of fear influencing zealous 
prosecutors and law enforcement officers to see mirages of 
treasonous conduct by American businesses and thus expanding the 
number of business-surveillance targets. Routine business-
networking and business-development efforts, especially in a 
burgeoning global economy, could be leading to commercial 
relationships that place an increased number of American businesses 
on the government’s list of terrorism suspects and squarely within 
the crosshairs of law enforcement’s surreptitious surveillance efforts. 
As our small world continues to shrink, so does the probability that 
an American business owner may unwittingly find herself to be a 
federal surveillance target.
Part I of this Article reviews Milgram’s small-world 
experiment and the NSA study of social networks. Part II presents 
the FISA legislation and a synopsis of its thirty-five-year evolution. 
Incorporated here is a comparison of other federal legislation that 
governs domestic-surveillance procedures. Part III reviews the state 
of domestic surveillance following 9/11. Part IV considers the 
potential implications FISA has on American commercial enterprises 
and urges businesses to recognize the acute need to consider the 
potential for unintended consequences. Part V suggests proactive 
measures that businesses should consider.
I. MILGRAM’S SMALL-WORLD PROBLEM AND THE SIX DEGREES OF 
SEPARATION PHENOMENON
The inaugural social science study of human connectivity is the 
result of a Harvard social psychologist named Stanley Milgram. 
Milgram designed the classic experiment that would demonstrate 
how closely linked earth’s inhabitants might be.26 He named his 
24. See infra note 452.
25. See infra note 452.
26. Stanley Milgram, The Small-World Problem, 1 PSYCHOL. TODAY 61, 67 
(1967).
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study the “Small-World Problem” after the cliché response of 
strangers who unexpectedly discover they share an acquaintance.27
Milgram’s work provided the initial empirical evidence supporting 
the theory that any individual may be connected to any other through 
a short chain of social ties.28 The small-world experiment received a 
great deal of attention among academic circles across multiple 
disciplines, but it would take nearly a quarter of a century and John 
Guare’s play entitled Six Degrees of Separation29 before Milgram’s 
concept fully escaped the bounds of academia and achieved the 
popular prominence it now holds. 
In Milgram’s studies, Kansas and Nebraska residents, the 
“start[ers],” received a packet and the identity of a person in 
Massachusetts who would serve as the “target” recipient of the 
packet.30 The participants received the charge to begin a chain by 
mailing the packet towards the target, but they were restricted to 
sending the packet only to individuals they knew on a first-name 
basis.31 After receiving the packet, that friend would then repeat the 
process.32 Each recipient of the packet would continue the chain by 
serving as a “degree” or “intermediary” along the packet’s path.33
The total number of intermediaries required to complete the chain 
and to successfully deliver the packet to the target represented the 
number of degrees that separated the starter from the Massachusetts 
target.34 To maintain a record of the intermediaries in each chain, 
Milgram instructed each person who received the packet and who 
then forwarded it to a friend to also mail a business reply or “tracer” 
card back to Milgram at Harvard University.35
Milgram’s Kansas and Nebraska studies of social connections 
revealed that the participants were separated, on average, by six 
degrees (meaning five intermediaries).36 In May 1967, Milgram first 
published the results from his human connectivity experiments in 
Kansas and Nebraska, studies he referred to as “acquaintance 
chain[s],”37 in the premiere issue of Psychology Today.
27. Id. at 61; see infra notes 511-17 and accompanying text.
28. See Milgram, supra note 26, at 62-63, 67.
29. JOHN GUARE, SIX DEGREES OF SEPARATION: A PLAY (1990).
30. Milgram, supra note 26, at 63-64.
31. Id. at 64.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 65.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 63-64.
36. Id. at 65.
37. Id. at 62. 
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In the parlance of network theory, a network such as the social 
network studied by Milgram is made up of nodes and links.38 The 
nodes are the people and entities comprising the network, and the 
links are the relationships between the nodes.39 Traversing one link 
between two nodes is one “hop.”40 A link can be categorized as a 
“strong tie,” a relationship with high intensity, or as a “weak tie,” a 
relationship with low intensity.41 An example of a strong tie might be 
a business partner with whom one consults several times a day 
during the work week, whereas an example of a weak tie might be a 
customer with whom the business has contact on a very infrequent 
basis.42 Some nodes, the “supernodes” or “hubs,” may be extremely 
active in frequently transmitting information to numerous nodes, 
while some nodes, the “peripherals,” have a low level of connectivity 
to a much fewer number of nodes and transmit information on a 
much less frequent basis.43 The office of the chief operating officer is 
usually a supernode, actively providing information to and receiving 
information from all of the business divisions. In contrast, a lower-
level researcher might be a peripheral, providing research results to a 
supervisor and very rarely communicating with others in the division 
or other divisions of the business.
The nodes typically are clustered, with many links among 
nodes within a cluster and fewer links between clusters or even 
structural holes between clusters.44 For example, each business 
division might be a cluster with many links among division 
employees, especially if the division is a closely knit one, and a 
fewer number of ties between that division and other divisions of the 
business. A particular business division may rarely communicate 
with other business divisions.45 A social network is dynamic, with a 
structure that changes over time or whose function varies depending 
on the type of information transmitted.46 For example, “[w]hen the 
information at issue is highly sensitive, perhaps because it reflects 
illegal or politically disfavored motivations, network members will 
38. Peter J. Denning, Network Laws, 47 COMM. ACM 15, 15 (2004).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 919, 953 (2005). 
42. See id.
43. Id. at 948.
44. Id. at 951-52, 954-55.
45. Denning, supra note 38, at 15.
46. Strahilevitz, supra note 41, at 951.
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have to be quite cautious about sharing information. In such 
circumstances, weak ties may become totally inactive, as individuals 
begin sharing information only with well-trusted associates.”47
When Milgram asked sophisticated audiences to guess the 
number of personal acquaintances required to link any two randomly 
selected individuals, it is not surprising that most guessed numbers in 
the hundreds.48 It was difficult for any of them to imagine that the 
number of hops between the two could actually be as low as six, and 
today, perhaps even lower.49 The fact is that the number of potential 
network clusters participated in by each of our acquaintances and the 
weak ties that may link those clusters with other clusters introduces 
structural complexity that makes “knowing” the network clusters to 
which the various clusters in which we operate are weakly linked 
improbable, if not wholly impossible.50 We may be cognizant of our 
strong ties with other nodes because we have so much in common 
with those nodes and correspond with them regularly, while the weak 
ties escape our notice because we have little connection with them, 
and the type of information transmitted may be very distinct from 
that communicated across strong ties. However, weak ties are 
important because they function as bridges across which information 
is transferred from one cluster to another.51 Limiting information 
flow to strong ties might produce stagnancy of knowledge, whereas 
being well informed requires the cross-pollination produced by 
information traversing weak ties.52
The government’s intelligence-gathering technology and 
legislatively expanded authority to utilize its technology with limited 
constraints allow the executive branch access to information about 
our networks that even we, as individuals, do not have, and 
American businesses are not exempt in any respect. A business’s 
networks, as well as the connections, both personal and professional, 
created by its employees fall soundly within the government’s desire 
to know. Although the government has had access to these networks, 
the American public has only gained knowledge of some of the 
47. Id. at 959.
48. Milgram, supra note 26, at 65.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 66-67.
51. Strahilevitz, supra note 41, at 955.
52. Id. at 954-57.
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government methods of mass surveillance in the aftermath of the 
June 2013 Edward Snowden disclosures.53
As revealed with the Snowden disclosures, the federal 
government has been doing its own study of social networks using 
telephone metadata produced under § 215 of the Patriot Act.54 The 
study begins with a query of information, such as a telephone 
number, known to be associated with a targeted foreign terrorist 
organization.55 This telephone number, the “seed,” is used as a 
starting point for the study,56 with the possibility of expanding 
investigation to as much as three hops from the target.57 This means 
53. Ewen MacAskill, Edward Snowden: How the Spy Story of the Age 
Leaked Out, GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/jun/11/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-profile?guni=Article:in%20body%
20link.
54. On August 9, 2013, the United States Department of Justice released an 
Administration White Paper that provides information on the method used to query 
the telephone metadata produced under § 215 of the Patriot Act. ADMINISTRATION 
WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF 
THE USA PATRIOT ACT 1 (2013) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER], available at
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/750210/administration-white-paper-section-
215.pdf. In addition, the government has been using information garnered through 
NSLs under § 505 of the Patriot Act to study social networks. See infra Section 
IV.B.
55. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 54, at 3.
56. The process begins with one piece of information that can be queried:
Under the FISC orders authorizing the collection, authorized queries may 
only begin with an “identifier,” such as a telephone number, that is 
associated with one of the foreign terrorist organizations that was 
previously identified to and approved by the Court. An identifier used to 
commence a query of the data is referred to as a “seed.” Specifically, 
under Court-approved rules applicable to the program, there must be a 
“reasonable, articulable suspicion” that a seed identifier used to query the 
data for foreign-intelligence purposes is associated with a particular 
foreign terrorist organization.
Id.
57. The government collects information within “two or three hops” from a 
suspected terrorist target. Philip Bump, The NSA Admits It Analyzes More People’s 
Data than Previously Revealed, WIRE (July 17, 2013, 12:35 PM), 
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/07/nsa-admits-it-analyzes-more-
peoples-data-previously-revealed/67287/ (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
White Paper explains how this is accomplished:
Under the FISC’s order, the NSA may also obtain information concerning 
second and third-tier contacts of the identifier (also referred to as “hops”). 
The first “hop” refers to the set of numbers directly in contact with the 
seed identifier. The second “hop” refers to the set of numbers found to be 
in direct contact with the first “hop” numbers, and the third “hop” refers to 
the set of numbers found to be in direct contact with the second “hop” 
numbers. Following the trail in this fashion allows focused inquiries on 
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that the government can begin with a target, take one hop to those 
with whom the target has connected (a first connection), take a 
second hop to those with whom the first connections have connected 
(a second connection), and, finally, take a third hop to those with 
whom the second connections have connected (a third connection). 
Sometimes the connections between hops are strong, such as a 
connection with a close relative or friend, but many times the 
connection is simply a connection, meaning that the bond between 
the two individuals was weak to the point of almost being 
nonexistent. The reach of the government’s collection within three 
hops of a target is extremely significant. As described in the 
following paragraphs, the government has several methods of 
constructing models of social networks.
Since November 2010, the NSA has been permitted to paint 
pictures of the activities of individuals and entities by performing 
“large-scale graph analysis on very large sets of communications 
metadata without having to check foreignness” of information in 
phone call and email logs.58 Although metadata does not contain the 
content of telephone calls and email correspondence, it does provide 
the time when the contacts began, the duration of the contacts, the 
location of the contacts, and the telephone number or email address 
of the contacts.59 In addition, NSA can enrich the “contact chain” by 
correlating metadata with other information available from third 
parties, “including bank codes, insurance information, Facebook 
profiles, passenger manifests, voter registration rolls and GPS 
location information, as well as property records and unspecified 
tax data.”60 As described in the following paragraphs, the NSA has 
gained access to more than just telephone metadata.
The location of one’s cellphone can be used by the government 
to study social networks, as the devices of more than 90% of 
cellphone users worldwide are located in close proximity to them 
numbers of interest, thus potentially revealing a contact at the second or 
third “hop” from the seed telephone number that connects to a different 
terrorist-associated telephone number already known to the analyst.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 54, at 3-4.
58. James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Examines Social Networks of U.S. 
Citizens Using Giant Databases, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2013, at 1 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
59. WHITE PAPER, supra note 54, at 3.
60. Risen & Poitras, supra note 58, at 1, 22. 
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throughout the day.61 The NSA gathers cellphone location 
information by tapping into cables connecting communications 
networks worldwide.62 While gathering location information on 
foreign targets, the NSA may incidentally gather location 
information on the cellphones of United States citizens.63 The
location information can be used to track the path of a target and 
show the relationship of the target with others whose paths cross that 
of the target, whether a single instance or a recurring basis, or others 
who travel in tandem with the target.64 In 2012, Justice Sotomayor 
noted the intrusiveness of the collection of location information 
alone, without even considering adding other metadata or third-party 
data to the mix: “GPS monitoring generates a precise, 
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a 
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, 
and sexual associations.”65
Thus, the NSA can employ telephone metadata and location 
information to diagram social networks. As described below, the 
NSA has additional methods of collecting information showing 
linkages among individuals and businesses comprising social 
networks.
The NSA collects contact-list information from email and 
instant-messenger users as email and messages pass through Internet 
switches located outside the United States.66 This collection method 
allowed the NSA access to “444,743 e-mail address books from 
Yahoo, 105,068 from Hotmail, 82,857 from Facebook, 33,697 from 
Gmail and 22,881 from unspecified other providers” in a single 
twenty-four hour period.67 Although the interception occurs outside 
61. ERIC SCHMIDT & JARED COHEN, THE NEW DIGITAL AGE: RESHAPING THE 
FUTURE OF PEOPLE, NATIONS AND BUSINESS 172 (2013).
62. Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations 
Worldwide, Snowden Documents Show, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-
locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-
bc56-c6ca94801fac_story.html.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring).
66. Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collects Millions of E-mail 
Address Books Globally, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-
mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-
7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html.
67. Id.
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the United States, the contact information collected is not limited to 
that of users other than United States citizens, as a digital message 
may take a circuitous global route even if traveling between two 
points in the United States, and a sizeable number of United States 
citizens live outside the United States.68 The contact list information 
is another tool that the NSA has to map the many connections 
between individuals and entities, be they professional, social, 
organizational, personal, or intimate; the interceptions may include 
personal information on a user’s contacts such as names, addresses, 
telephone numbers, and email addresses, as well as business and 
familial relationships.69 At the same time, the contact list information 
may yield false positives by allowing the NSA to hypothesize about 
a connection, even if the connection was not brought to fruition or is 
not ongoing.70
In October 2013, it was revealed71 that the NSA, together with 
the British intelligence agency Government Communications 
Headquarters, tapped the fiber-optic cables connecting the data 
centers of Google and Yahoo.72 This is a significant feat because of 
the safeguards built into the data systems of those companies.73 “To 
guard against data loss and system slowdowns, Google and Yahoo 
maintain [fortress-like] data centers across four continents and 
connect them with thousands of miles of fiber-optic cable.”74 These 
globe-spanning networks, representing billions of dollars of 
investment, are known as clouds because data moves seamlessly 
around them.75 The data flowing on the cables includes both archived 
and newer information.76 “For the data centers to operate effectively, 
they synchronize [high] volumes of information about account 
holders. Yahoo’s internal network, for example, sometimes transmits 
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, 
Google Data Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-
to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-
say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html; Charlie 
Savage, Claire Cain Miller & Nicole Perlroth, N.S.A. Said to Tap Google and Yahoo 
Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2013, at B1.
72. Savage, Miller & Perlroth, supra note 71.
73. Gellman & Soltani, supra note 71.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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entire e-mail archives—years of messages and attachments—from 
one data center to another.”77
This program, referred to as Muscular, copies the data flowing 
through the cables outside the United States and routes the data into
a buffer capable of storing three to five days of data.78 The data can 
be decoded, to make the companies’ data formats accessible, and 
filtered, to separate out the potentially useful data.79 NSA can suggest 
100,000 search terms, or selectors, to mine the data collected.80 The 
data flowing through the cables can include “email, online document 
and photo storage and search queries.”81 Through this program, NSA 
gains access to information transmitted by unsuspecting Yahoo and 
Google users.82 “NSA’s acquisitions directorate sends millions of 
records every day from . . . Yahoo and Google [internal] networks to 
data warehouses at the agency’s [Fort Meade headquarters].”83
United States executive branch officials have provided the 
NSA with telephone numbers of foreign politicians at the urging of 
the NSA; in addition, some officials volunteered such numbers.84 “In 
one recent case, . . . a US official provided NSA with 200 phone 
numbers to 35 world leaders.”85 This information became public in 
the wake of German chancellor Angela Merkel calling President 
Obama to question him as to whether the United States had 
conducted surveillance on her mobile telephone and reports that the 
NSA had targeted European Union senior officials.86 Thus, the NSA 
may be able to monitor the communications of other senior officials. 
“Despite the fact that the majority is probably available via open 
source, the PCs [intelligence production centers] have noted 43 
previously unknown phone numbers. These numbers plus several 
others have been tasked.”87 À la the Milgram study, the NSA may 
use the numbers provided to build a chain of connections that can be 
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Savage, Miller & Perlroth, supra note 71, at B6.
82. Gellman & Soltani, supra note 71.
83. Id.
84. James Ball, NSA Monitored Calls of 35 World Leaders After US Official 
Handed Over Contacts, GUARDIAN (Oct. 24, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-
calls.
85. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Id.
87. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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monitored. “These numbers have provided lead information to other 
numbers that have subsequently been tasked.”88
Our own cognitive limitations, not to mention time constraints 
and everyday obligations, are factors that hamper what we know 
about the many network clusters we populate and the people who 
occupy them with us. This void in knowledge serves, in fact, as the 
impetus for the premise of this Article. The notable paradox of 
Milgram’s small-world effect is that individuals perceive that they 
live in a large world of restricted social connectedness, almost 
always oblivious to the greater probability of connectedness that 
exists. Today, however, through a process of mutual social mapping 
and networking tools, our connections are largely determinable. In 
fact, this paradox and the value of examining the small-world 
networks we create within the larger world have not escaped the 
scrutiny of federal authorities. Their keen desire to fully understand 
our connections, even if we remain indifferent to them, is one 
catalyst for the creation of surveillance tools that facilitate their 
understanding. Thus, with social connection mapping using 
information available from third parties and intelligence gathering 
tools, such as NSLs, business-records requests, and FISA, all 
presently available to federal authorities, their knowing is made 
much easier.
In putting together the puzzle of the reach of government 
surveillance into the affairs of individuals and businesses, it is 
helpful to have a background on the development of the legal 
relationship between the United States government and those who 
might be subject to government surveillance. As the following Part 
indicates, over the nation’s history there has been an ebb and flow in 
the legal basis and the practical reality of government intrusion into 
what one might think to be private.
II. THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA)
A. The Road to FISA
By 1844, wire communications offered new mechanisms of 
communicative exchange and new issues for privacy advocates. 
Because wiretaps provided a means for officers to gain critical 
information about criminals without risking confrontation, 
88. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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recognition of the value of wire surveillance was immediate, and 
wiretapping by the country’s executive branch was born.89
Early in the twentieth century, in Olmstead v. United States90
the United States Supreme Court applied a very literal interpretation 
of the Constitution in denying protection against surreptitious 
eavesdropping by the executive branch.91 Writing for the five–four 
majority, Chief Justice Taft opined that voluntary telephone 
conversations secretly overheard did not equate to “material things” 
that could be seized.92 The Court’s property-oriented perspective of 
Fourth Amendment rights was rooted in the reasoning that there 
could be no physical intrusion when the parties to the telephone 
conversation intentionally projected their words outside their 
homes.93 Olmstead vested control of electronic surveillance within 
the discretion of the executive branch and shielded the intelligence-
gathering technique from Fourth Amendment scrutiny for nearly 
forty years.94
In 1967, nearly four decades after Olmstead, the Supreme 
Court accepted the opportunity to address the constitutional concerns 
surrounding warrantless electronic surveillance.95 The Court 
measured the validity of surveillance in terms of privacy 
expectations rather than property interests and, overruling Olmstead,
decisively changed surveillance law in the United States.96 In the 
landmark case, Katz v. United States,97 the Court abandoned the 
requirement of physical trespass as a prelude to invoking Fourth 
89. GINA STEVENS & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-326,
PRIVACY: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL STATUTES GOVERNING WIRETAPPING AND 
ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING 2 (2012).
90. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
353 (1967).
91. Id. at 466.
92. Id. at 464.
93. Id. at 464-66; see also Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) 
Have Ears: The Background and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 795-96 (1989).
94. Cinquegrana, supra note 93, at 796-800.
95. Katz, 389 U.S. at 347, 353 (overruling Olmstead). The Supreme Court 
reversed a gambling conviction when the government, without prior judicial 
authority, employed an electronic listening and recording device outside of a 
telephone booth used by Katz to take and place bets. Id. at 348, 359. The Court 
reversed a finding of guilt because it found that the government’s use of warrantless 
electronic surveillance was a violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
Id. at 358-59.
96. Id. at 353.
97. Id. at 347.
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Amendment protection, heralding a victory for privacy.98 It also 
created a presumption against warrantless electronic surveillance 
when it ruled that wiretaps were sufficiently intrusive to implicate 
Fourth Amendment concern.99
The Katz ruling accomplished two significant achievements. 
First, Justice Stewart’s majority opinion established that electronic 
surveillance constitutes a “search” for the purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment by shifting the focus of Fourth Amendment protection 
from places to people.100 The decision prohibited the government 
from conducting electronic surveillance without both a showing of 
probable cause and a warrant issued by a neutral and detached 
magistrate.101 Secondly, Justice Harlan’s concurrence established 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” as the doctrinal test for 
determining when a probable-cause warrant would be required under 
the Fourth Amendment.102 “Since [Katz], the touchstone of [Fourth] 
Amendment analysis has been . . . whether a person has a 
‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy’” in the 
area searched or the thing seized.103
Acknowledging law enforcement limits of electronic 
surveillance, the Katz Court also questioned for the first time the 
executive branch’s established practice of conducting warrantless 
electronic surveillance for the purpose of national security.104
However, in a very controversial footnote the Court expressly 
avoided requiring judicial authorization of surveillance in matters 
98. Id. at 352-53.
99. Id. at 356-57.
100. Id. at 351, 356-57. Justice Stewart reasoned:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as 
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.
Id. at 351 (internal citations omitted).
101. Id. at 355-56.
102. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan deduced “the rule 
that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that 
a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, 
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Id. 
at 361; see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001); California v. Ciraolo, 
476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
103. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (quoting Katz, 389 
U.S. at 360).
104. 389 U.S. at 358 n.23 (majority opinion).
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involving national security.105 Notably, the decision specifically 
recognized a distinction between law-enforcement and national-
security requirements for electronic surveillance.106
Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan concurred with the Katz 
result, but both rejected a national-security exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections.107 Justice Douglas suggested that such an 
exception would convey a “green light for the Executive Branch to 
resort to electronic eavesdropping without a warrant in cases which 
the Executive Branch itself labels ‘national security’ matters.”108
Justice Douglas reasoned that “when the President and Attorney 
General assume both the position of adversary-and-prosecutor and 
disinterested, neutral magistrate” the Fourth Amendment rights of 
national-security suspects could not be assured.109 Justice Douglas 
argued that it was the judicial branch rather than the executive 
branch that must serve as the neutral and disinterested party 
mediating between the needs of law enforcement and the individuals 
targeted for surveillance.110
The lack of consensus on the Court concerning electronic 
surveillance and national security highlighted concerns of “the 
efficacy of self-imposed regulation and restraint as a safeguard 
against executive abuse.”111 The Court deliberately left questions 
unanswered and, consequently, delivered the opinion absent 
additional guidance for the executive branch.112 The decision would, 
however, eventually provide direction to Congress and would serve 
as the impetus for subsequent congressional action addressing 
electronic-surveillance requirements.113
In 1968, the legislative branch tackled questions presented by 
the use of wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveillance, and 
the procedural distinction between law enforcement and national 
105. Id. “Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate 
would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is 
a question not presented by this case.” Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 359-60 (Douglas, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 359.
109. Id. at 360.
110. Id. at 359-60.
111. Elizabeth Gillingham Daily, Comment, Beyond “Persons, Houses, 
Papers and Effects”: Rewriting the Fourth Amendment for National Security 
Surveillance, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 641, 647 (2006).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 647-48.
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security.114 What resulted was comprehensive wiretapping and
electronic-eavesdropping legislation that established uniform 
guidelines through which law enforcement officials could obtain 
judicial approval to accomplish electronic surveillance.115 Title III of 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III) 
prohibited wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping unless federal 
and state law enforcement officers adhered to strict limitations, 
including establishing probable cause before conducting surveillance 
of wire or oral communication.116
Under Title III, wiretap orders were available only in the 
enforcement of enumerated serious crimes.117 The statute mandated 
that government officials satisfy numerous protocols before applying 
for an order authorizing a wiretap.118 One such requirement 
necessitated that applicants indicate that alternative investigative 
techniques had failed or were reasonably expected to fail.119 In many 
respects, Title III’s procedures were a heightened departure from the 
usual probable cause mandates employed for physical searches.120 Its 
provisions applied to traditional criminal investigations and did not 
address the surveillance authority of the President. The statute would 
later undergo change and emerge anew as the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act.121
Enacting Title III legislation demonstrated marked movement 
toward privacy protection by the United States Supreme Court and 
Congress. Both governmental branches, however, withdrew before 
addressing the executive branch’s use of presidential authority to 
conduct warrantless electronic surveillance for national-security 
purposes.122 While some argue the judicial and legislative branches 
refrained from regulating the executive branch out of deference, the 
inaction nevertheless perpetuated the President’s continued 
114. Id. at 647.
115. Id. at 647-48. See George P. Varghese, Comment, A Sense of Purpose: 
The Role of Law Enforcement in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 385, 388-89 (2003).
116. Timothy Casey, Electronic Surveillance and the Right to Be Secure, 41 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 977, 999 (2008) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2000)).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 2516. 
118. Id. § 2518.
119. Id. § 2518(1)(c).
120. See Casey, supra note 116, at 999-1000.
121. The new legislation is discussed later in this Article. See infra Section 
II.C.
122. Cinquegrana, supra note 93, at 801.
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surveillance without judicial oversight.123 In 1972, the United States 
Supreme Court granted appellate review in United States v. United 
States District Court, often referenced as Keith, on the narrow issue 
of whether Fourth Amendment protection applied in surveillance 
questions involving domestic security.124
The Keith case, named for the district court judge, revealed that 
the government had conducted warrantless electronic surveillance of 
the defendants.125 When the defendants objected and sought to have 
the government disclose the evidence collected, the government 
argued that the surveillance was essential “‘to gather intelligence 
information deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts of 
domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of 
the Government.’”126 Further, the government insisted the 
surveillance was lawful under the national-security exception to the 
Fourth Amendment and was not subject to disclosure.127 Contrary to 
the government’s efforts, the trial court found in favor of the 
defendants and ruled that the government’s surreptitious surveillance 
was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.128
Upon review, the Supreme Court scrutinized whether the 
executive branch possessed inherent constitutional authority to 
execute warrantless surveillance of domestic organizations for 
national-security purposes in contradiction of, or as an exception to, 
the Fourth Amendment.129 The Court acknowledged that 
investigations undertaken in the name of national security potentially 
implicated both First and Fourth Amendment protections and posed 
“greater [constitutional] jeopardy” than cases involving ordinary 
crime.130 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Powell concluded 
that responsibility rested with the Court to balance “the duty of 
Government to protect the domestic security, and the potential 
danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy and 
free expression.”131
123. Id.
124. 407 U.S. 297, 309 (1972). The case involved the criminal trial of 
individuals charged with bombing a CIA office in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Id. at 299.
125. Id. at 299-301.
126. Id. at 300 (quoting Att’y Gen. Aff. 20).
127. Id. at 300-01 & n.2.
128. Id. at 301.
129. Id. at 299.
130. Id. at 313.
131. Id. at 299, 314-15. Eight of the nine Justices voted against the 
government. Id. at 297. Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the discussions or the 
decision, “presumably because he had worked on the wiretap issue when he served 
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Adopting Justice Douglas’s rationale in Katz, the Court warned 
of
the tendency of Government—however benevolent and benign its 
motives—to view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute its 
policies. Fourth Amendment protections become the more necessary when 
the targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy 
in their political beliefs. The danger to political dissent is acute where the 
Government attempts to act under so vague a concept as the power to 
protect “domestic security.” Given the difficulty of defining the domestic 
security interest, the danger of abuse in acting to protect that interest 
becomes apparent.132
In the end, the Court found that the President’s authority was 
insufficient to excuse warrantless electronic surveillance of purely 
domestic threats to national security.133 Recognizing that the 
potential for abuse was too great and the rights protected were so
fundamental, the Court ruled that, in intelligence-gathering 
investigations involving surveillance of domestic organizations, the 
Fourth Amendment required the executive branch to demonstrate 
probable cause of criminal wrongdoing and to seek judicial 
as head of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Nixon Justice Department” and 
publicly supported the government’s position. See Tracey Maclin, The Bush 
Administration’s Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Fourth Amendment’s 
Warrant Requirement: Lessons from Justice Powell and the Keith Case, 41 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1259, 1264 & n.14 (2008).
132. Keith, 407 U.S. at 314. See also James Madison’s correspondence to 
Thomas Jefferson in 1798 at the height of the quasi-war against France in which he 
penned:
The management of foreign relations appears to be the most susceptible of 
abuse, of all the trusts committed to a Government, because they can be 
concealed or disclosed, or disclosed in such parts and at such times as will 
best suit particular views; and because the body of the people are less 
capable of judging, and are more under the influence of prejudices, on that 
branch of their affairs, than of any other. Perhaps it is a universal truth that 
the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger, 
real or pretended, from abroad.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 13, 1798), in 2 LETTERS AND 
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 140-41 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 
1865).
133. Keith, 407 U.S. at 308, 314-15. The Court’s decision was particularly 
startling in light of the fact that four of the Justices were new Nixon appointees 
considered to be sympathetic to the President’s position on wiretapping. See Maclin, 
supra note 131, at 1264. Furthermore, Justice Powell had authored a controversial 
op-ed article supporting wiretapping in national security cases just months prior to 
the Keith decision. Id. Consequently, his authoring the Keith decision rejecting the 
government’s claim makes the decision all the more astonishing. Id.
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authorization prior to conducting electronic surveillance.134 The 
Court emphasized that its decision did not extend to surveillance 
involving foreign powers or their agents and in so doing, created a 
distinction between domestic and foreign-intelligence surveillance 
that did not previously exist.135 For the Court, Justice Powell urged 
Congress to develop legislation codifying standards for national-
security surveillance that distinguished it from the criminal 
surveillance governed by Title III.136
B. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)137
Following Keith, confusion abounded concerning national-
security surveillance,138 the Fourth Amendment, and the executive 
branch’s authority to conduct warrantless surveillance to inform 
national-security efforts.139 Warrantless electronic surveillance 
conducted by the executive branch had been ongoing for over fifty 
years when the Supreme Court delivered the Keith decision, but the 
ruling seemed to have little impact on the President’s ongoing 
134. Keith, 407 U.S. at 320.
135. Id. at 322 & n.20.
136. Id. at 321-24, 322 n.20.
137. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 
Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885c (2012)).
138. It is helpful for one to have some knowledge of the manner in which 
conversations are monitored to understand government surveillance. Conversations 
are secretly monitored through what may be referred to as either “targeted 
surveillance” or “trawling surveillance.” CTR. ON LAW & SEC., FOR THE RECORD,
THE NSA WIRETAPPING PROGRAM 7 (2007), available at
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Documents/NSA_jan_07.pdf (internal 
quotation marks omitted). A targeted surveillance would be a wiretap monitoring the 
telephone number or conversations of a particular known terrorist, someone 
associated with a terrorist, or a suspected terrorist. Id. A computer facilitates 
trawling surveillance by screening the flow of a large body of telecommunications 
traffic to detect information, such as key words, that might indicate a connection to 
terrorism. Id. For the computer expert, data mining is simply “a relatively narrow 
process of using algorithms to discover predictive patterns in data sets”; applying 
those patterns to sift through a database to discover relevant evidence is “automated 
data analysis.” MARY DEROSA, DATA MINING AND DATA ANALYSIS FOR 
COUNTERTERRORISM 3 (2004). However, the term data mining as used in this paper 
includes both processes.
139. See generally S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 1-15 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (1783 Stat.) 3904-17, available at http://www.cnss.org/
data/files/Surveillance/FISA/Cmte_Reports_on_Original_Act/SJC_FISA_Report_95
-604.pdf (describing history of national security surveillance and explaining the 
need for regulation).
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warrantless-surveillance efforts at home and abroad.140 Antagonism 
was brewing, if not boiling, in Congress over the executive branch’s 
expansion of objectionable surveillance of American citizens.
1. The Church Committee
Congress reacted in 1975 by commissioning an investigation 
led by Senator Frank Church to examine executive abuses of 
electronic surveillance.141 The Church Committee’s inquiries 
uncovered staggering abuses of unregulated electronic surveillance 
of American citizens by the executive branch.142 The committee 
uncovered far-ranging infringements of individual privacy interests, 
particularly surreptitious domestic surveillance of Americans who 
were not readily identifiable as sources of foreign-intelligence 
information.143
During a television interview, Senator Church stated:
That capability at any time could be turned around on the American 
people and no American would have any privacy left, such [is] the 
capability to monitor everything: telephone conversations, telegrams, it 
doesn’t matter. There would be no place to hide. If this government ever 
became a tyranny, if a dictator ever took charge in this country, the 
technological capacity that the intelligence community has given the 
government could enable it to impose total tyranny, and there would be no 
way to fight back, because the most careful effort to combine together in 
resistance to the government, no matter how privately it was done, is 
within the reach of the government to know. Such is the capability of this 
technology . . . . I don’t want to see this country ever go across the bridge. 
I know the capacity that is there to make tyranny total in America, and we 
must see to it that this agency and all agencies that possess this technology 
operate within the law and under proper supervision, so that we never 
cross over that abyss. That is the abyss from which there is no return.144
The committee’s multi-volume report contained findings 
indicating that constituents of the executive branch, including the 
FBI and NSA, as well as other government agencies, had used 
140. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
141. S. REP. NO. 94-755, at iv-v (1976).
142. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
143. S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 4-7.
144. Senator Frank Church, Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Aug. 
17, 1975), quoted in James Bamford, They Know Much More Than You Think, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/
2013/aug/15/nsa-they-know-much-more-you-think/?pagination=false); see also IPA 
Media, Frank Church Warns of Govt. Surveillance in 1975, YOUTUBE (Aug. 8, 
2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9DjJKYYb5-4, for a portion of Senator 
Church’s statement.
Guilty by Association 1057
perceived threats to national security as the justification to conduct 
warrantless surveillance targeting American citizens.145 Disturbing 
revelations further proved that Americans became surveillance 
targets not because they were believed to be real threats to national 
security but because of the citizens’ membership in certain groups.146
According to the Church Committee, citizen targets “included 
political adherents of the right and the left, ranging from activist to 
casual supporters. Investigations have been directed against 
proponents of racial causes and women’s rights, outspoken apostles 
of nonviolence and racial harmony; establishment politicians; 
religious groups; and advocates of new life styles.”147 Civil rights 
advocates, including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., were also popular 
surveillance targets.148 In one year alone, the FBI conducted 65,000 
domestic-intelligence investigations in utter disregard for the existing 
legal and constitutional constraints.149
In effect, the executive branch had exercised unilateral 
discretion absent any oversight to secretly select and monitor targets, 
often without any indication of their involvement in criminal 
activity.150 Reporting that “[g]overnment officials—including those 
whose principal duty is to enforce the law—have violated or ignored 
the law over long periods of time and have advocated and defended 
their right to break the law,”151 the Church Committee concluded:
Too many people have been spied upon by too many Government 
agencies and [too] much information has been collected. The Government 
has often undertaken the secret surveillance of citizens on the basis of their 
political beliefs, even when those beliefs posed no threat of violence or 
illegal acts on behalf of a hostile foreign power.152
2. Enacting FISA
The Church Committee Report wrought a great public outcry, 
following closely on the heels of the uncertainty brought by the Keith
145. S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 5-6, 12; Beryl A. Howell & Dana J. Lesemann, 
FISA’s Fruits in Criminal Cases: An Opportunity for Improved Accountability, 12
UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 145, 149 (2007).
146. S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 6-9.
147. Id. at 7.
148. Id. at 7-8, 11-12.
149. Id. at 6.
150. Id. at 5-6; Howell & Lesemann, supra note 145, at 149.
151. S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 5.
152. Id.
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decision.153 Congress responded by addressing the executive branch’s 
abuses and the Church Committee’s recommendations with 
legislation.154 FISA established “a procedure under which the 
Attorney General can obtain a judicial warrant authorizing the use of 
electronic surveillance in the United States for foreign intelligence 
purposes.”155 Through FISA, the legislative branch created a legal 
mechanism authorizing the executive branch to intercept 
communications of foreign powers,156 but requiring intelligence 
agencies to obtain judicial authority in the form of a court order, not 
a warrant, for the domestic surveillance of Americans.157 To 
safeguard the separation between foreign-intelligence surveillance 
and law-enforcement surveillance, Congress required certification by 
the Attorney General that “the purpose” of a proposed FISA 
surveillance was the gathering of foreign-intelligence information.158
Judicial oversight under FISA requires the justice department 
to obtain advance authorization from a congressionally created 
special court known as the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC).159 Originally, FISC was comprised of seven United States 
district judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court.160 Later amendments adjusted the number of FISC 
judges to eleven to address the increased demand for FISA orders.161
153. Howell & Lesemann, supra note 145, at 149.
154. Id. at 149-50.
155. S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3906 
(emphasis added), available at http://www.cnss.org/data/files/Surveillance/FISA/
Cmte_Reports_on_Original_Act/SJC_FISA_Report_95-604.pdf.
156. The original bill’s operative provision authorized a judge to “approv[e] 
electronic surveillance of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power for the 
purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information.” Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the 
Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 3-4 (1976) (text of 
H.R. 12750, 94th Cong. § 2522 (1976)), available at http://www.cnss.org/
data/files/Surveillance/FISA/1970s_Cong_Hearings/G_fisa041276_part_1a.pdf. 
That language remains unchanged. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(b) (2000).
157. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 
§ 102(b), 92 Stat. 1783, 1787-88 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885c).
158. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B) (addressing electronic surveillance), 
1823(a)(7)(B) (addressing physical evidence).
159. Id. § 1803(a), (b). Although the usual precursor to wiretapping is 
obtaining a court order, FISA permits wiretapping in an emergency situation if 
application for a court order is made within seven days. Id. § 1805(e)-(f).
160. Id. § 1803(a). Because the judges are all U.S. district court judges, FISC 
is deemed a proper Article III court.
161. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1) (2012).
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The appointed judges serve non-renewable, seven-year terms.162
FISC has jurisdiction only “to hear applications for” FISA 
surveillance “and grant orders approving electronic surveillance.”163
Congress also created an appellate court known as the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR).164 FISCR is 
comprised of three federal judges who are designated by the Chief 
Justice, and the court’s jurisdiction is limited solely to reviewing the 
denial of any FISA application.165 In its thirty-six-year history, 
FISCR has heard only one appeal.166 FISC and FISCR hearings are 
conducted ex parte and are otherwise closed.167 Beginning with June 
2013, certain “public filings” with FISC are available.168 In addition, 
a redacted October 3, 2011 FISC opinion and order are available.169
FISA mandates that a surveillance application include a 
description of the target of the surveillance and a statement of facts 
justifying the government’s belief that the target is a foreign power 
or agent of a foreign power.170 Additionally, the government must 
justify its belief that the target facility “is being used, or is about to 
be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”171 As 
originally enacted, a high-level executive official was required to 
certify that (1) the surveillance objective was foreign-intelligence 
information; (2) “‘the purpose’ of the surveillance [was] to obtain 
foreign intelligence information”; and (3) the information sought 
could not be obtained by normal investigative techniques.172 Finally,
a successful FISA application must contain a statement of the 
government’s proposed minimization procedures—those procedures 
162. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(d) (2000).
163. Id. § 1803(a).
164. Id. § 1803(b).
165. Id.
166. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam).
167. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803(c), 1805(a). The ex parte nature of FISC proceedings 
is not deemed to represent any delegation of judicial authority to the executive 
branch.
168. Public Filings – U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, U.S.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE CT., http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/public-
filings (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
169. GOVERNMENT’S EX PARTE SUBMISSION OF REAUTHORIZATION 
CERTIFICATION AND RELATED PROCEDURES, EX PARTE SUBMISSION OF AMENDED 
CERTIFICATIONS, AND REQUEST FOR AN ORDER APPROVING SUCH CERTIFICATION AND 
AMENDED CERTIFICATIONS (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011), available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/fisc_opinion_10.3.2011.pdf.
170. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(2)-(3) (2012).
171. Id. § 1804(a)(3)(B).
172. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(A)-(C) (2000) (internal quotation marks added).
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“which shall be adopted by the Attorney General” designed to 
minimize the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of nonpublic 
information obtained through FISA surveillance that is not foreign-
intelligence information.173
Once the FISA surveillance application is certified by the 
Attorney General and submitted to FISC, FISA requires the court to 
approve an order “as requested or as modified,” so long as the court 
finds “probable cause to believe that . . . the target of the electronic 
surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power,” and 
that the target facility “is being used, or is about to be used, by a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”174 Of significance is 
the fact that FISA’s probable cause standard is a “foreign-
intelligence standard” of probable cause, not a Fourth Amendment 
standard, requiring only that the government demonstrate that the 
target may be an agent of a foreign government.175
Once the appropriate government actor certifies that the 
purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign-intelligence 
information, FISA prohibits a FISC judge from reviewing the 
government’s certification.176 The only exception to this bar arises 
when the target is a United States citizen.177 In cases where the FISA 
target is an American, a FISC judge may review the government’s 
certification, but only if “clearly erroneous.”178 Given that applying 
to FISC for a FISA surveillance order is an ex parte procedure—not 
the usual adversarial procedure during which opposing counsel may 
challenge the government’s version of the facts—oversight by an 
173. Id. §§ 1801(h)(1)-(2), 1804(a)(5).
174. Id. § 1805(a) (emphasis added).
175. Id. FISA defines foreign-intelligence information to include information 
the federal government would need to guard against acts such as “attack,” 
“sabotage,” or “clandestine intelligence activities,” all of which concern a foreign 
power or its agent, and information concerning a foreign power or its agent related 
to United States defense, security, or foreign affairs. Id. § 1801(e). FISA defines 
foreign power to include a foreign government, a group that is a faction of or 
directed by a foreign government, a political organization, or an international group 
engaged in terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1801(a) (2012). Many FISA provisions differentiate between a United States 
person and one not falling within that definition, generally providing more 
protection for a United States person. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A), (5) 
(2000). FISA defines a United States person to include a United States citizen and a 
resident alien. Id. § 1801(i).
176. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (2000).
177. Id.
178. Id. § 1805(a)(5).
Guilty by Association 1061
adversary is missing.179 The presiding FISC judge recently 
characterized FISC oversight as limited: “‘The FISC is forced to rely 
upon the accuracy of the information that is provided to the 
Court.’”180 The presiding judge added: “‘The FISC does not have the 
capacity to investigate issues of noncompliance, and in that respect 
the FISC is in the same position as any other court when it comes to 
enforcing [government] compliance with its orders.’”181
Surveillance orders authorized by FISC have a statutory 
duration of up to ninety days when the target is determined to be an 
agent of a foreign power or up to 120 days when the target is 
determined to be an agent of a foreign power who is not a United 
States person.182 When the target is considered a foreign power, the 
FISA court order permits surveillance for up to one year.183 There is 
no statutory requirement that targets be provided any information 
regarding the surveillance or the information intercepted, regardless 
of whether the information is gathered via electronic surveillance or 
“sneak and peak” searches.184 The only notification required occurs 
only if the target is charged with a crime and the government intends 
to use the fruits of the FISA surveillance in his prosecution.185
Additionally, Congress wanted to ensure that the legislative 
branch and the judicial branch were better informed about the 
executive branch’s national-security-surveillance activities. 
Accordingly, FISA compels a series of reporting measures to be 
satisfied by the Attorney General.186 First, in April every year, the 
Attorney General is expected to deliver an accounting to the 
Administrative Office of the United States Court and to Congress of 
the number of applications made to FISC for domestic-wiretap 
orders and the number of applications granted, modified, or 
179. Id. § 1805(a).
180. Carol D. Leonnig, Court: Ability to Police U.S. Spying Program 
Limited, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2013) (quoting the Honorable Reggie B. Walton),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/court-ability-to-police-us-spying-program-
limited/2013/08/15/4a8c8c44-05cd-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html.
181. Id. (quoting the Honorable Reggie B. Walton).
182. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(d)(1) (2012). The “United States person” is defined as 
a citizen, legal permanent resident, an unincorporated association in which a 
“substantial number” of members are citizens or legal permanent residents, or a 
corporation incorporated in the United States as long as such association or 
corporation is not itself a “foreign power.” See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (2000).
183. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(d)(1) (2012).
184. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c) (2000).
185. Id. In 1994, Congress amended FISA, expanding surveillance to include 
applications for orders authorizing physical searches. Id. §§ 1821-1829.
186. Id. §§ 1807-1808.
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denied.187 Additionally, Congress included in FISA the requirement 
that the Attorney General report to certain congressional committees 
twice annually.188 The biannual reports must disclose (1) the number 
of applications for surveillance where the location of the wiretap is 
unknown; (2) a description of criminal cases in which wiretap 
information acquired under FISA is introduced; and (3) the number 
of emergency wiretap authorizations without court orders and the 
number of subsequent court orders granting or denying such 
surveillance.189
C. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986190
New technologies would, again, draw attention to gaps in the 
nation’s surveillance laws. With the adoption of advancements, such 
as email, Congress returned to Title III in 1986, replacing it with the 
new Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).191 Almost a 
decade following FISA, ECPA became the next significant legal 
change to domestic electronic surveillance.192 As was true with Title 
III, Congress attempted to strike a balance between the privacy 
interests of individuals and the law enforcement concerns of the 
executive branch.193 Consistent with the application of Title III, 
ECPA applies to traditional criminal investigations and controls 
domestic electronic surveillance initiated for law enforcement 
purposes.194 The ECPA list of suspected crimes for which a warrant 
187. Id. § 1807. For a table containing a summary of FISA annual reports, 
see Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders 1979-2014, supra note 12.
The information can be found in graph form at FISA Orders: 1979-2013: FISA 
Court Orders and National Security Letters Issued, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO.
CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_graphs.html (last visited Nov. 6, 
2014).
188. 50 U.S.C. § 1808(a)(1).
189. 50 U.S.C. § 1808(a)(2) (2012). Other reports are required to certain 
members of Congress. Id. §§ 1802(a)(1)-(2), 1826, 1846, 1862, 1871, 1881f(2), 
1885c.
190. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 
100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See supra Section II.A.
194. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2012) (regulating authorization for interception of 
wire, oral, or electronic communications). Besides applying to actions under color of 
law, the ECPA applies to individuals. Id. § 2511. ECPA permits the government and 
individuals to secretly tape a conversation as long as the person taping is a party to 
the conversation or a party to the conversation consents to the conversation being 
secretly taped. Id. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). Otherwise, it is illegal for an individual to 
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may be obtained increased substantially from Title III’s original 
offenses to a list that includes ninety-six listed crimes, but the 
requisite court authorization can be issued only to obtain evidence 
relative to one or more of the listed crimes.195 By way of example, 
persons suspected of illicit drug trafficking, white collar crimes, and 
other felonious conduct are typical targets of criminal surveillance 
pursuant to ECPA.196
ECPA separates electronic surveillance into three fields: the 
Wiretap Act, which addresses the interception of wire 
communications;197 the Stored Communications Act, which includes 
communications stored during or subsequent to transmission;198 and 
the Pen Register Act, which addresses the use of pen registers and 
trap-and-trace devices.199 Congress extended the electronic-
eavesdropping prohibition to email and other electronic-
communication capabilities presented with new technologies.200 In 
sum, the ECPA bans wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping; 
possession of wiretapping or electronic-eavesdropping equipment; 
use or disclosure of information obtained through illegal wiretapping 
or electronic eavesdropping; and disclosure of information secured 
secretly tape a conversation and the individual may be subject to up to a five-year 
prison term or fine or both. Id. § 2511(1), (4)(a). That provision also applies to the 
government, but the government may obtain a wiretap order, as more fully explained 
in this Article. See supra Section II.A.
195. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516(1), 2518(3)(a).
196. Id. § 2516(1).
197. Id. §§ 2510-2522.
198. Id. §§ 2701-2712. These provisions of ECPA were another legislative 
response to earlier judicial action. In United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 
(1976), the Supreme Court ruled that a customer had no Fourth Amendment privacy 
expectation in the records his bank maintained concerning his transactions with 
them. The Court reasoned that the bank’s records were third-party records, and 
consequently, they were available to the government under subpoena duces tecum,
not requiring the more rigorous requirement of a warrant. Id. at 443-46. 
199. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127. These provisions of ECPA were another 
legislative response to earlier judicial action. In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
745-46 (1979), the Supreme Court refused to require a warrant for the state’s use of 
a pen register or trap-and-trace device employed to identify the telephone numbers 
for calls made and received from a particular telephone. The Court found no Fourth 
Amendment search or seizure occurred, ruling that the customer had no expectation 
of privacy knowing that the telephone company would maintain such information in 
the regular course of business for billing or service purposes. Id. at 741-46; see infra
notes 399-04 and accompanying text.
200. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511.
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through court-ordered wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping to 
obstruct justice.201
To obtain a court order allowing surreptitious wiretapping 
under the ECPA, the United States Attorney General, his designee, 
or a state prosecuting attorney must authorize the application for the 
order.202 Typically, an ECPA wiretap order is effective within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the judge issuing the order, but in its 
broadest sense, the wiretap is limited to domestic surveillance within 
the United States.203
The statute mandates that the government satisfy the criminal 
standard of probable cause.204 In part, an ECPA application must 
contain a number of specific pieces of information, perhaps the most 
crucial of which include the government’s substantiation of 
reasonable belief that a warrant-eligible crime has been, is being, or 
is about to be committed.205 Other required information includes the 
location of the planned surveillance, the type of communication to be 
intercepted, and the name of the target.206 ECPA applicants must also 
provide the identity of the person making the application, the identity 
of the person who authorized the application, the justification for the 
use of wiretapping over other types of criminal investigation, the 
requested duration of the wiretap, and information on prior wiretaps 
conducted of the same target or at the same location.207 Although the 
usual precursor to wiretapping is obtaining a court order, ECPA 
permits wiretapping in an emergency situation if application for a 
court order is made within forty-eight hours of beginning 
surveillance.208
A judge may issue a wiretap order if the judge finds that the 
application was properly authorized, that there is probable cause that 
the target is connected to one of the enumerated crimes, that the 
wiretap will lead to relevant evidence, and that the specified wiretap 
location is connected to the crime.209 Further, the judge must also 
201. Id. §§ 2511-2512.
202. Id. § 2516.
203. Id. § 2518(3). A federal judge or a properly authorized state court judge 
may enter a court order authorizing the wiretap. Id. §§ 2510(9), 2518.
204. Id. § 2518(3).
205. Id. § 2518(1)(b).
206. Id. Under certain circumstances, the court order may allow a roving 
wiretap. Id. § 2518(11).
207. Id. § 2518(1).
208. Id. § 2518(7).
209. Id. § 2518(3).
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find that there is no plausible alternative to the use of wiretapping.210
ECPA requires that the wiretap order contain much of the 
information included in the application.211 Additionally, the judge 
may order others, including the telecommunications service provider, 
to provide assistance.212 The judge may also require reports 
concerning law enforcement progress in obtaining information 
concerning the subject crime.213 Effective for up to thirty days, the 
wiretap order may warrant additional thirty-day extensions if the 
court finds continuing probable cause to extend the wiretap’s 
duration.214
Although typical applications for ECPA wiretap orders involve 
ex parte proceedings usually heard in open court, ECPA mandates 
that both the wiretap application and the orders themselves be 
sealed.215 Notwithstanding the statutory seal, ECPA also requires that 
the target be notified of the wiretap within ninety days of its 
termination.216 If the government intends to use the wiretap
information as evidence, ECPA compels the government to supply 
the surveillance target with the wiretap information at least ten days 
prior to the court proceeding in which the evidence will be 
presented.217
D. The USA PATRIOT Act and Recent Amendments to FISA
On a fateful morning in September 2001, nineteen Muslim 
extremists hijacked control of four American commercial passenger 
jets.218 Employing the passenger-laden aircraft as weapons, the 
hijackers crashed into the World Trade Center towers in New York 
City; the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.; and a field in Shanksville, 
210. Id. § 2518(3)(c).
211. Id. § 2518(4).
212. Id.
213. Id. § 2518(6).
214. Id. § 2518(5).
215. Id. § 2518(8)(b).
216. Id. § 2518(8)(d). A judge may delay the date on which the target is 
required to be provided the wiretap information upon a showing of good cause. Id.
217. Id. § 2518(9). A judge may waive the ten-day period under certain 
circumstances. Id. The party against whom the government seeks to use the wiretap 
evidence may move to suppress the evidence on certain grounds. Id. § 2518(10)(a).
218. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 1-14 (2004), available at http://www.9-
11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
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Pennsylvania.219 The massive attack by foreigners on American soil 
generated a rapid response by Congress aimed at reducing the 
likelihood that similar assaults could ever occur again. The resulting 
legislation, passed forty-five days following the attacks on 
September 11, was intended to “provide[] enhanced investigative 
tools and improve[] information sharing for the law enforcement and 
intelligence communities to combat terrorism.”220 Entitled the 
“Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) 
Act of 2001” (Patriot Act),221 the legislation expanded the powers 
granted to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The increased 
authority allows the executive branch to surreptitiously engage in 
roving wiretaps, “sneak-and-peak” searches, use of pen registers and 
trap-and-trace devices, business-record searches, and Internet 
communication and use tracking.222 Additionally, the Patriot Act 
attempted to remove barriers and enhance the exchange of 
information between the historically segregated intelligence and law 
enforcement communities.223
Though the Patriot Act is a newly enacted piece of legislation, 
it may be better understood as an extensive list of minor amendments 
to existing laws.224 The Patriot Act, which is divided into ten 
sections, includes a section entitled “Enhanced Surveillance 
Procedures,”225 which significantly amends both FISA226 and 
ECPA.227
219. Id.
220. H.R. REP. NO. 107-236, pt. 1, at 41 (2001), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-107hrpt236/pdf/CRPT-107hrpt236-pt1.pdf.
221. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
222. Id. § 206 (roving surveillance authority), § 213 (“sneak-and-peak” 
warrants), § 214 (pen register and trap-and-trace authority), § 215 (business-records 
searches), § 217 (interception of computer trespasser communications). Several 
Patriot Act provisions, including § 215, were originally scheduled to sunset on 
December 31, 2005. Id. § 224. On March 9, 2006, President Bush signed into law 
the Reauthorization Act, extending several provisions, of which § 215 was one. 
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006). After several extensions, § 215 is scheduled to sunset on 
June 1, 2015. PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-14, § 2(a), 
125 Stat. 216 (2011).
223. USA PATRIOT Act § 504; see infra notes 230-31 and accompanying 
text.
224. See Casey, supra note 116, at 1003.
225. USA PATRIOT Act §§ 201-225.
226. Id. §§ 206-208, 214-215, 218, 225.
227. Id. §§ 201-204, 209-210, 212, 216-217, 220, 223.
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The Patriot Act amended FISA in two significant ways. First, it 
altered FISA’s national-security probable cause standard, a standard 
already substantially less stringent from the Fourth Amendment 
probable cause test, diminishing the FISA standard even further. 
Prior to the Patriot Act, the gathering of foreign intelligence had to 
be “the” reason for the executive branch’s search and surveillance 
efforts.228 After the Patriot Act, FISA required only that foreign 
intelligence be “a significant purpose” of the government’s 
intrusion.229 A related amendment, referred to as the “coordination 
amendment,” defined the areas in which federal law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies were permitted to engage in coordinated 
foreign-intelligence gathering.230 This addition allows federal 
prosecutors to work with intelligence agencies to jointly conduct 
surveillance operations pursuant to FISA when investigating crimes 
falling within the “foreign intelligence information” definition.231
The Attorney General was able to capitalize on the reduction in 
the “purpose” standard for conducting FISA surveillance and craft 
surveillance guidelines that allowed FISC authorization to be granted 
even when the primary ends of surveillance related to ordinary 
crime.232 In essence, the executive branch attempted to completely 
reverse FISA’s original standard by suggesting the FISA surveillance 
could “be used primarily for . . . law enforcement purpose[s], as long 
as a significant foreign intelligence purpose remain[ed].”233 Attorney 
228. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2000).
229. USA PATRIOT Act § 218 (internal quotation marks omitted).
230. Id. § 504. This amendment did not replace any prior FISA language, but 
added “the coordination with law enforcement” section:
(k)(1) Federal officers who conduct electronic surveillance to acquire 
foreign intelligence information under this title may consult with 
Federal law enforcement officers to coordinate efforts to 
investigate or protect against—
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an 
agent of a foreign power; or
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or 
network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
231. Id.
232. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft to FBI Dir., Assistant 
Attorney Gen., Criminal Div., Counsel for Intelligence Policy, & U.S. Attorneys 
(Mar. 6, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ag030602.html.
233. Id. (emphasis added).
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General Ashcroft’s efforts were intended to break down the “wall” 
built by Congress and the original FISA.234
In May 2002, Ashcroft sought a FISC order utilizing the 
Department of Justice’s newly revised FISA surveillance 
guidelines.235 FISC reinforced the “wall” and, for the first time since 
1978, required the government’s application to be modified.236 FISC 
rejected the Department of Justice (DOJ) procedures that would 
allow federal prosecutors access to the FISA electronic-surveillance 
process for ordinary criminal investigations.237 FISC, which had 
operated in complete secrecy for nearly thirty years, published its 
first opinion as a protest to Ashcroft’s newly proposed procedures 
for FISA surveillance.238 The court alluded to governmental abuse, 
citing the September 2000 government admission that it had made 
“misstatements and omissions of material facts” in at least seventy-
five of its FISA applications.239 FISC also noted that the DOJ 
“procedures appear to be designed to . . . substitute the FISA for 
Title III electronic surveillances and Rule 41 searches.”240 As further 
justification for its decision, FISC expressed grave concerns that
criminal prosecutors will tell the FBI when to use FISA (perhaps when 
they lack probable cause for a Title III electronic surveillance), what 
techniques to use, what information to look for, what information to keep 
as evidence and when use of FISA can cease because there is enough 
evidence to arrest and prosecute.241
The DOJ appealed the FISC decision—another first.242 In its 
first twenty-three years, FISC had never denied a single government 
application.243 It is not surprising that FISC’s first denial also 
engendered the first appeal to FISCR.244 In its lone decision, FISCR 
234. Id.
235. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 613 (FISA Ct.), rev’d sub nom. In re Sealed Case, 310 
F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam).
236. Id. at 613, 625; Nola K. Breglio, Note, Leaving FISA Behind: The Need 
to Return to Warrantless Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 113 YALE L.J. 179, 188 
(2003).
237. All Matters Submitted, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 625.
238. Id. at 611.
239. Id. at 620.
240. Id. at 623.
241. Id. at 624.
242. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per 
curiam).
243. Breglio, supra note 236, at 188.
244. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 719.
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decisively rejected the FISC position, reversing the prior decision.245
The court ruled, in part, that FISA was never meant to apply only to 
foreign-intelligence gathering relative to national security, but that it 
could be used for ordinary criminal cases, in seeming contradiction 
of the legislative intent.246 Further, FISCR held that the Fourth 
Amendment does not require separation between law enforcement 
and foreign-intelligence operations when federal prosecutors use 
FISA surveillance to gather criminal evidence in connection with 
foreign-intelligence crimes.247
In essence, FISCR eviscerated the very foundation that 
previously allowed FISA to pass constitutional muster. FISA’s 
reduced probable cause standard falls far short of satisfying the 
Fourth Amendment probable cause test, a point FISCR refused to 
acknowledge. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence requires a warrant 
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, a finding of probable 
cause that a crime has been or is being committed, and the 
designation of the places to be searched and the things to be 
seized.248 By designating FISA’s purpose as one serving national 
security, Congress created a statutory scheme that allowed FISA 
surveillance to fall outside the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement and made it significantly easier for federal authorities to 
acquire surveillance approval.249
The relative ease with which a FISA warrant can now be 
obtained became the subject of attorney Brandon Mayfield’s claims 
against the United States.250 Mayfield, his family, and his law 
practice were all subjected to FISA surveillance following the 2004 
245. Id. at 730-31.
246. Id. at 727-36.
247. Id. at 736-46.
248. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
249. See Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1105 (2006).
250. Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1030 (D. Or. 2007), 
vacated, 599 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010). In a decision that departs from the majority 
of the constitutional challenges to FISA, the Mayfield court declined to adopt the 
analysis and conclusions of other courts addressing FISA. Id. at 1042-43. The 
United States District Court for the District of Oregon found that FISA, specifically 
§§ 1804 and 1823, as amended by the Patriot Act, violate the Fourth Amendment 
and are unconstitutional. Id. However, on appeal the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit vacated the lower court judgment. Mayfield, 599 F.3d at 966. 
“We hold that, in light of the limited remedy available to Mayfield, he does not have 
standing to pursue his Fourth Amendment claim because his injuries already have 
been substantially redressed by the Settlement Agreement, and a declaratory 
judgment would not likely impact him or his family.” Id.
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terrorist bombing of the commuter trains in Madrid, Spain.251 Many 
facts demonstrated that Mayfield had no part in the terrorist attack.252
For example, at the time the government submitted its certification 
for a FISC warrant, Mayfield’s passport was not current, and he had 
not left the United States since his service in Germany as a U.S. 
Army lieutenant approximately ten years prior.253 The Spanish 
authorities had determined his fingerprint did not match the 
fingerprint obtained.254 Additionally, the Spanish authorities 
attributed the bombing to individuals from northern Africa, not the 
United States.255 Finally, there was no connection found between 
Mayfield, his family, or his law practice and Spain or North 
Africa.256 Nevertheless, the government secured the authorization 
necessary to conduct continued electronic surveillance of Mayfield’s 
personal and business affairs, repeated physical searches of both his 
home and his office, and seizure of his personal effects and business 
files and computers.257 Eventually, Mayfield was completely 
exonerated.258
After the FISCR panel decision, though, questions continue to 
arise about whether the ECPA and the Fourth Amendment are any 
longer effectual. By allowing FISA surveillance in criminal 
investigations, FISCR paved a path to authorized surveillance with 
greatly reduced hurdles for government investigators. The expanded 
availability of FISA suggests that FISA surveillance will be the 
method of choice, allowing federal prosecutors and law enforcement 
officers to avoid the Fourth Amendment prescriptions.
One indication of this may be the fairly steady increase in the 
number of FISA applications for FISC orders filed by the federal 
government and the extremely low number of applications rejected. 
For the first twenty years, approved FISA applications numbered 
fewer than 1,000 per year, from a low of 207 to a high of 839.259
Beginning with 2002 through 2012, there were over 1,000 FISA 
applications approved annually, with over 2,000 FISA applications 
251. Mayfield, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1026-28.
252. Id. at 1033.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1028-29.
258. Id. at 1029.
259. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders 1979-2014, supra 
note 12.
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approved annually for four of those years.260 From 1979 through 
2002, FISC did not reject a single FISA application.261 From 2003 
through 2012, FISC rejected only twelve FISA applications.262
III. CURRENT STATE OF DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE
[P]rivacy is what we keep to ourselves; secrecy is what is kept from us. 
Privacy is a right claimed by citizens. Secrecy is a privilege claimed by 
government.263
In a 1951 speech during the early part of the Cold War, 
Associate Justice Robert H. Jackson warned that, in the heat of 
patriotic fervor, the public might willingly cede some of its civil 
liberties.264 Justice Jackson stated, “It is easy, by giving way to the 
passion, intolerance and suspicions of wartime, to reduce our 
liberties to a shadow, often in answer to exaggerated claims of 
security.”265 He warned that this was the wrong course to follow:
The essence of liberty is the rule of law. . . . Because liberty cannot exist 
apart from the impartial rule of law, it is vulnerable to wartime stresses, 
for then the rule of law breaks down. The same passions and anxieties may 
result from a long period of tension which may be almost as demoralizing 
as actual war.”266
He added, “Wartime psychology plays no favorites among rights but 
tends to break down any right which obstructs its path.”267
Only nine days after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 
President Bush declared the War on Terror. “Our war on terror 
begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until 
every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and 
defeated. . . . We will take defensive measures against terrorism to 
protect Americans.”268 The allusion to the country being at war tends 
to produce a psychological reaction of fear, making the general 
public more inclined to forego some measure of privacy in light of 
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Jeff Jarvis, Welcome to the End of Secrecy, GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2013, 
11:56 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/06/nsa-
surveillance-welcome-end-secrecy.
264. Robert H. Jackson, Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFF.
L. REV. 103, 116 (1951).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 104.
267. Id. at 112.
268. H.R. DOC. NO. 107-122, at 3-4 (2001).
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the threat to national security.269 President Bush was not the first 
United States leader to use the war analogy in spearheading the 
country’s drive against some perceived social problem.270 In so 
doing, he harkened back to the just-war theory that originated with 
St. Augustine in the fifth century of engaging in a righteous war 
sanctioned by religious authority.271 President Bush stated, “Freedom 
and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know 
that God is not neutral between them. Fellow citizens, we’ll meet 
violence with patient justice, assured of the rightness of our cause, 
and confident of the victories to come.”272 As in wartime, this War on 
Terror shifted power to the executive branch and away from 
Congress and the judicial branch, with discussion focusing on 
national security, often at the expense of civil liberties, and the 
executive branch cloaking actions, such as the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program in secrecy.273 The explosive nature of a terrorist attack on 
the country was a catalyst sparking a heretofore unimagined 
expansion of executive authority.
President Obama continued down the path of invoking the just-
war theory as the foundation for government surveillance. A mere 
two weeks prior to the first NSA revelation, President Obama made a
major speech concerning the country’s continued War on Terror.274
While still invoking the just-war theory, the President was careful to 
proclaim that the executive branch’s actions were legally 
269. Jackson, supra note 264, at 104, 112, 116.
270. Since World War II, “[w]ar infected language, not only as a metaphor 
for efforts to ameliorate major social problems but also in the everyday idioms of 
social life, from sport to business. The United States declared war on cancer, crime, 
drugs, and poverty; military terms became part of the common vocabulary.” Richard 
H. Kohn, The Danger of Militarization in an Endless “War” on Terrorism, 73 J.
MIL. HIST. 177, 191 (2009).
271. David Gibson, ANALYSIS: Is ‘Just War’ Doctrine Another Victim of the 
Syrian Conflict?, U.S. CATHOLIC (Sept. 11, 2013, 1:51 PM), 
http://www.uscatholic.org/news/201309/analysis-%E2%80%98just-war%E2%80%
99-doctrine-another-victim-syrian-conflict-27815; see also H.R. DOC. NO. 107-122, 
at 6.
272. H.R. DOC. NO. 107-122, at 6.
273. See infra notes 326-43 and accompanying text. “[T]he Administration 
went forward without Congress and using its own interpretations of the constitution 
and legal opinions rendered in secret, took matters into its own hands . . . in 
wiretapping foreign nationals and even American citizens.” Kohn, supra note 270, at 
198-99.
274. President Barack H. Obama, Address at the National Defense 
University (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/23/read-president-obamas-speech-on-the-future-of-the-
war-on-terror/.
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sanctioned.275 “Moreover, America’s actions are legal. . . . Within a 
week, Congress overwhelmingly authorized the use of force. . . . So 
this is a just war—a war waged proportionally, in last resort, and in 
self-defense.”276 The President acknowledged that the War on Terror 
had created a tension between intelligence gathering and citizens’ 
loss of privacy but affirmed the value of surveillance.277 “[S]ome 
[measures taken], like expanded surveillance, raised difficult 
questions about the balance we strike between our interests in 
security and our values of privacy. . . . Much of our best counter-
terrorism cooperation results in the gathering and sharing of 
intelligence . . . .”278 He recognized that surveillance has to take into 
account newly evolving methods of communication.279 “[W]e will 
have to keep working hard to strike the appropriate balance between 
our need for security and preserving those freedoms that make us 
who we are.”280 He elaborated, “That means reviewing the authorities 
of law enforcement, so we can intercept new types of 
communication, and build in privacy protections to prevent abuse.”281
The wartime-like impassioned atmosphere comes at a time of 
immense NSA technological capability, as has been revealed 
throughout the Snowden documents,282 government secrecy claimed 
necessary for national security,283 and almost no oversight by FISC 
or Congress.284 These factors must be seen in light of the human 
temptation of government agents operating within the government’s 
cloak of invisibility to invade what privacy the average citizen or 
business once thought it had, whether this stealth operation was 
crucial to gather foreign-intelligence information on terrorists or 
satisfied some other purpose, such as for political or economic 
advantage. With immense technological capability there is a natural 
potential for misuse, and the government would be loath to dismantle 
such capability once constructed. Besides the potential for misuse, 
innocent individuals may be targeted due to human error or false 
positives.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See infra Section III.C.
283. See infra Section III.A.
284. See supra Subsection II.B.2.
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One reporter who broke the early Snowden stories stated, 
“‘The . . . United States doesn’t actually need, or the NSA doesn’t 
need a specific reason in order to spy on people and collect their 
communications.’”285 He continued, “‘They do it because they’ve 
developed this technology that lets them do it, and their institutional 
mandate is just to constantly seek out more and more.’”286 He added, 
“‘I think what we did made the threat much, much worse, and at the 
same time, destroyed many of the freedoms that we’ve all been 
taught define what the United States is all about.’”287
The United States district judge who issued a preliminary 
injunction foreclosing government telephone metadata collection as 
to two plaintiffs found little evidence of the necessity of the 
government program.288
[T]he Government does not cite a single instance in which analysis of the 
NSA’s bulk metadata collection actually stopped an imminent attack, or 
otherwise aided the Government in achieving any objective that was time-
sensitive in nature. In fact, none of the three recent episodes cited by the 
Government that supposedly illustrate the role that telephony metadata 
analysis can play in preventing and protecting against terrorist attack 
involved any apparent urgency.289
Various FISC opinions criticize NSA operations for not abiding 
by FISC oversight.290 Not surprisingly, there have been a number of 
instances in which NSA employees took unfair advantage of NSA 
surveillance capabilities to satisfy recreational or personal 
interests.291 An NSA Inspector General’s report identified twelve 
investigated and substantiated cases of unauthorized employee 
spying over a ten-year period; however, there are likely many more 
unauthorized NSA employee spying incidents that were never 
discovered.292
285. John Hockenberry, Glenn Greenwald: The U.S. Is Not Safer Since 9/11,
TAKEAWAY (Dec. 16, 2013) (quoting Glenn Greenwald), 
http://www.thetakeaway.org/story/glenn-greenwald-us-not-safer-911/.
286. Id. (quoting Glenn Greenwald).
287. Id. (quoting Glenn Greenwald).
288. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 43 (D.D.C. 2013) (order 
granting preliminary injunction). 
289. Id. at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted).
290. See infra notes 385-92 and accompanying text.
291. See Paul Lewis, NSA Employee Spied on Nine Women Without 
Detection, Internal File Shows, GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2013, 5:08 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/27/nsa-employee-spied-detection-
internal-memo.
292. Id. Although all personal, the reasons for the surveillance varied:
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Surreptitiously overhearing a conversation otherwise thought to 
be private has long been thought to be morally wrong, as one is using 
secrecy to take unfair advantage of the conversants. However wrong, 
human nature has succumbed to this temptation for centuries, as in 
the legend of the ring of Gyges.293 Glaucon, a character in Plato’s 
The Republic, is discussing with Socrates the tension between 
morality and social constraint.294 During this discussion, Glaucon 
relates the tale of Gyges as an example of the manner in which one 
would act if unobserved and removed from social constraints.295
As told by Glaucon, Gyges the shepherd climbed down into an 
opening made by an earthquake where he saw a hollow horse 
figure.296 He entered the figure through a door and found a dead body 
inside with a gold ring on its finger, which he removed from the 
body before returning to the surface.297 While he was meeting with 
the other shepherds, he discovered that he could make himself 
invisible by turning the ring on his finger and reverse the process by 
turning the ring once more.298 Following that discovery, he managed 
One of the cases emerged in 2011[, ]when an NSA employee based 
abroad admitted during a lie-detector case that he had obtained details 
about his girlfriend’s telephone calls “out of curiosity[.”] He retired last 
year.
In a similar case, from 2005, an NSA employee admitted to obtaining 
his partner’s phone data to determine whether she was “involved” with 
any foreign government officials. In a third, a female NSA employee said 
she listened to calls on an unknown foreign telephone number she 
discovered stored on his cell phone, suspecting he “had been unfaithful[.”]
In another case, from two years ago, which was only discovered 
during an investigation [sic] another matter, a woman employee of the 
agency confessed that she had obtained information about the phone of 
“her foreign-national boyfriend and other foreign nationals[.”] She later 
told investigators she often used the NSA’s surveillance tools to 
investigate the phone numbers of people she met socially, to ensure they 
were “not shady characters[.”]
The case of the male NSA employee who spied on nine women 
occurred between 1998 and 2003. The letter states that the member of staff 
twice collected communications of an American, and “tasked nine 
telephone numbers of female foreign nationals, without a valid foreign 
intelligence purpose, and listened to collected phone conversations[.”]
Id.
293. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 32 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Dover Thrift ed. 
2000) (1894).
294. Id. at 30.
295. Id. at 32.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
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to be chosen as a messenger to the court.299 There at court, Gyges 
used his new-found power of invisibility to gain control of the 
kingdom after first winning over the queen and plotting with her to 
kill the king.300
Communication privacy seems to always have been vulnerable, 
under surveillance ranging from low technology eavesdropping to 
high technology government digital interception, with the law 
lagging behind in offering the individual or business much 
protection. For example, by the late 1800s, technology was 
facilitating eavesdropping through sound recording, as Louis D. 
Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren recognized in their 1890 law review 
article, The Right to Privacy.301 “Recent inventions and business 
methods . . . have invaded the sacred precincts of private and 
domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make 
good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be 
proclaimed from the house-tops.’”302
For Brandeis and Warren, privacy was important as a 
fundamental right, with protection for privacy recognized, to some 
extent, in existing law.303 “The common law secures to each 
individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his 
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to 
others.”304 They advocated that the sweep of the law be enlarged to 
provide civil redress for invasion of privacy.305 “[T]he existing law 
affords a principle which may be invoked to protect the privacy of 
the individual from invasion . . . by . . . the possessor of any . . . 
modern device for recording or reproducing scenes or sounds.”306
They broached the creation of the tort of invasion of privacy to 
secure the individual’s “inviolate personality”307 by the law
protecting one’s right “to be let alone.”308 To them, creation of the 
invasion of privacy tort was needed in light of recent technological 
advances that threatened maintenance of privacy.309 The authors 
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 195 (1890).
302. Id.
303. Id. at 198.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 206.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 204-05.
308. Id. at 193, 205.
309. Id. at 208, 213.
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envisioned this right to privacy “as a part of the more general right to 
the immunity of the person,—the right to one’s personality.”310
In 1897, Oliver Wendell Holmes, a contemporary of Warren 
and Brandeis, was present at the Boston University School of Law’s 
dedication of a new lecture hall and gave his address The Path of the 
Law.311 The “bad man” from this address is somewhat reminiscent of 
Glaucon’s Gyges.312 Holmes stated:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad 
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge 
enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for 
conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of 
conscience.313
Thus, Holmes drew a distinction between the bad man, whose 
actions are constrained by the law, and the good one, who operates 
according to ethical principles.314
While viewing the law as “systematized prediction,”315 Holmes 
stated:
You can see very plainly that a bad man has as much reason as a good one 
for wishing to avoid an encounter with the public force, and therefore you 
can see the practical importance of the distinction between morality and 
law. A man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and 
practised [sic] by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to 
avoid being made to pay money, and will want to keep out of jail if he 
can.316
This means that the good man acts in accordance with morality and, 
in so doing, conforms to legal standards; the acts of the bad man may 
coincide with those of the good one, but the motivation of the bad 
man is to escape fine or criminal sanction.317 “But if we take the view 
of our friend the bad man we shall find that he does not care two 
straws for the axioms or deductions, but that he does want to know 
what the . . . courts are likely to do in fact.”318 Holmes then asks, 
“But what does [legal duty] mean to a bad man?”319 A bad man looks 
310. Id. at 207.
311. O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 n.1 
(1897).
312. Id. at 459; see supra text accompanying notes 293-300.
313. Holmes, supra note 311, at 459.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 458.
316. Id. at 459.
317. See id.
318. Id. at 460-61.
319. Id. at 461.
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to the law as defining the contours of permissible action and as “a 
prophecy that if he does certain things he will be subjected to 
disagreeable consequences by way of imprisonment or compulsory 
payment of money.”320
One recognizes figures similar to Holmes’s bad man and good 
man in the dialog between Glaucon and Socrates when Glaucon 
provides Gyges as an example of someone who would not act in a 
just fashion if given the opportunity and temptation of taking 
advantage of a situation.321 After recounting the Gyges legend, 
Glaucon sounds as if he is discussing Holmes’s “bad man” when 
observing that “a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that 
justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever 
any one thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust.”322
Later, in The Republic, Socrates refutes the idea that one acts justly 
only if compelled to do so because “justice in her own nature has 
been shown to be best for the soul in her own nature. Let a man do 
what is just, whether he have the ring of Gyges or not.”323
In evaluating the appropriate level of oversight of NSA 
activities, one might consider human propensity to act like Holmes’s 
bad man or Glaucon’s Gyges if given the opportunity. “‘Human 
beings are always going to try to develop more technologies to give 
themselves greater power’ . . . .”324 Under the guise of protecting 
national security, the executive branch would likely make the most 
of whatever exception to the privacy ordinarily expected by an 
individual or business that the law permits in the context of gathering 
foreign-intelligence information. “‘[T]he challenges for [those with 
technology] is for other human beings to organize on their own to 
come up with ways to control and limit that technology so it doesn’t 
do massive amounts of harm. And this kind of tension is critical.’”325
Combining the impassioned rhetoric of the just-war theory, far-
reaching technological capability, and minimal oversight by FISC or 
Congress with the propensity to maximize executive branch power, it 
is no wonder that loss of communication privacy is the result.
320. Id.
321. PLATO, supra note 293, at 32-33.
322. Id. at 33. 
323. Id. at 269.
324. Hockenberry, supra note 285 (quoting Glenn Greenwald).
325. Id. (quoting Glenn Greenwald).
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A. The Terrorist Surveillance Program326
The government’s been in bed with the entire telecommunications 
industry since the forties. They’ve infected everything. They get into your 
bank statements, computer files, email, listen to your phone calls. . . . 
Every wire, every airwave. The more technology used, the easier it is for 
them to keep tabs on you.327
In 2005, New York Times reporters Risen and Lichtblau 
reported that the Bush administration had issued a secret executive 
order authorizing warrantless domestic wiretapping.328 The reporters 
revealed that in 2002, President Bush significantly altered American 
intelligence gathering when he authorized the NSA to conduct 
warrantless wiretapping within the United States to obtain evidence 
of terrorist activity.329 Under the guise of what the White House 
named the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), the NSA proceeded 
to monitor simultaneously and without warrants up to 500 people at 
one time within the United States and approximately 5,000 to 7,000 
326. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers 
Without Courts: Secret Order to Widen Domestic Monitoring, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 
2005, at A1; see also OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN. OF THE DEP’T OF DEF., DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF 
NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, REPORT NO. 2009-0013-AS, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE 
PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM (2009) [hereinafter OFFICES OF INSPECTORS 
GEN.], available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0907.pdf.
327. ENEMY OF THE STATE (Jerry Bruckheimer 1998) (quoting retired NSA 
agent Edward “Brill” Lyle, played by actor Gene Hackman), available at
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120660/quotes. David Marconi, the movie 
screenwriter, took his inspiration for the movie from a James Bamford book, The 
Puzzle Palace. Eric Benson, Will Smith Already Played Edward Snowden: Enemy of 
the State Screenwriter David Marconi Says He Warned Us About the NSA Fifteen 
Years Ago, N.Y. MAG., July 1, 2013, available at http://nymag.com/news/frank-
rich/enemy-of-the-state-2013-7/. Although some thought the movie plot “far-
fetched,” the Edward Snowden revelations fifteen years later coincide with some of 
the movie dialog. Id. In his interview with The Guardian, Snowden stated:
“The NSA has built an infrastructure that allows it to intercept almost 
everything. With this capability, the vast majority of human 
communications are automatically ingested without targeting. If I wanted 
to see your emails or your wife’s phone, all I have to do is use intercepts. I 
can get your emails, passwords, phone records, credit cards.”
Ewen MacAskill, Edward Snowden, NSA Files Source: ‘If They Want to Get You, In 
Time They Will,’ GUARDIAN (June 9, 2013) (quoting Edward Snowden), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/nsa-whistleblower-edward-
snowden-why.
328. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 326, at A1.
329. Id.
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people located outside the United States at one time.330 The aggregate 
result was that a large number of American email correspondences 
and telephone calls were secretly monitored without any court or 
congressional approval.331 The full extent of the warrantless 
surveillance is unknown.
After the TSP activities came to light, the Bush Administration 
admitted the program did not comply with FISA, but defended the 
legality of the program, stating that the war in which we are engaged 
is “a different war.”332 In invoking the just-war theory, President 
Bush claimed broad executive branch warlike freedoms of action. 
Contravening FISA on many points, the TSP had an NSA employee 
rather than a federal judge serving as the gatekeeper, wholly 
contradicting the checks and balances supposed by the original FISA 
Congress.333 The NSA employee determined what data-mining 
results required further targeted surveillance.334 The standard 
employed by the NSA employee for commencing further TSP 
surveillance was allegedly one of “reasonable suspicion,” but many 
questions arose as to whose reasonable suspicion was required—
certainly not that of an objective magistrate.335 Another FISA 
violation was the failure to fully report the executive branch’s 
intelligence-collection activities.336 FISA requires annual and 
biannual reporting to the judicial branch and Congress, 
respectively.337 Quite to the contrary, until the TSP was exposed 
publicly, knowledge of its existence was very limited, and the 
330. Id. at A16; see also William C. Banks, The Death of FISA, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 1209, 1213 (2007).
331. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 326, at A1, A16.
332. Banks, supra note 330, at 1259-60 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo of the Office of Legal Counsel of the 
Department of Justice prepared several legal memoranda in support of the TSP. 
OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN., supra note 326, at 10-14. Certain of the TSP activities 
initiated under presidential authority were transitioned to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court, with presidential authority for the TSP lapsing on February 1, 
2007. Id. at 30. In the Report, the Inspectors General expressed some concern with 
the widespread data collection. Id. at 38. “[T]he collection activities pursued under 
the [President’s Surveillance Program], and under FISA following the PSP’s 
transition to that authority, involved unprecedented collection activities. We believe 
the retention and use by IC organizations of information collected under the PSP and 
FISA should be carefully monitored.” Id.
333. Banks, supra note 330, at 1259.
334. Id. at 1259-60.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 1257-58.
337. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1807-1808 (2012).
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executive branch staunchly denied any such secret intelligence 
gathering was being conducted.338
TSP was accomplished in large part because of the cooperation 
of various telecommunications companies who previously had 
conditioned surveillance assistance on statutory compliance.339 The 
cooperation of the telecommunications companies facilitated 
government data mining of telecommunications, with the 
government performing computerized searches of massive stores of 
data.340 Once the TSP became public knowledge, many 
telecommunications companies found themselves a target of another 
type—named as defendants in litigation challenging the warrantless 
secret surveillance.341 In fact, one of the most controversial of the 
2008 FISA amendments granted a statutory defense to 
telecommunications companies who had cooperated with the 
government.342 The cooperation of the telecommunications 
companies facilitated government data mining of 
telecommunications, with the government performing computer 
searches of vast rivers of data.343
B. The Protect America Act344
“The intelligence community has worried about ‘going dark’ forever, but 
today they are conducting instant, total invasion of privacy with limited 
effort . . . . This is the golden age of spying.”345
Revelations of TSP provided the foundation for Congress’s 
passage of the Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA).346 The PAA 
338. Banks, supra note 330, at 1257-58.
339. Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence 
Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901, 910-11, 913 (2008).
340. See id. at 912.
341. See, e.g., Hepting v. AT & T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 
2006) (surviving motions to dismiss and motion for summary judgment), remanded,
539 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (remanding in light of the FISA Amendments Act of 
2008).
342. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 201, 122 Stat. 
2436, 2467 (2008) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1885-1885c).
343. Cf. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1885-1885c.
344. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007).
345. Nicole Perlroth, Jeff Larson & Scott Shane, N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic 
Safeguards of Privacy on Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2013, at A1 (quoting Paul 
Kocher, a cryptographer, commenting on NSA capability), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-
encryption.html?_r=0.
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preempted a Patriot Act-expanded FISA, further enlarging 
presidential authority and reducing the vestiges of constitutional 
protection, when electronic surveillance was “directed at a person 
reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States.”347
The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General 
received the task of shaping the meaning of “directed at” through the 
development of “reasonable procedures.”348 More troubling still, the 
legislation required only that “a significant purpose of the acquisition 
[be] to obtain foreign intelligence information.”349 Congress 
mandated no greater link between the person targeted for 
surveillance and an agent of a foreign power (or terrorist).350
Although Congress passed the PAA, it did so with a 180-day 
sunset provision before recessing for the summer.351 The legislation 
subsequently expired when congressional representatives balked at 
extending immunity to the telecommunications companies that had 
assisted the executive branch with its TSP monitoring.352 Granting 
these corporations a statutory defense proved to be a sticking point 
and one of the more controversial issues,353 ultimately preventing the 
PAA’s extended duration. Upon the expiration of the PAA, FISA 
was reinstated until the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 became 
effective in July 2008.354
346. James Risen, Bush Signs Law to Widen Reach for Wiretapping, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/08/06/washington/06nsa.html. Kate Martin, director of the Center for National 
Security Studies in Washington commented, “‘This more or less legalizes the N.S.A. 
program.’” Id. (quoting Kate Martin).
347. Protect America Act § 2 (emphasis added).
348. Id.; see Paul M. Schwartz, Warrantless Wiretapping, FISA Reform, and 
the Lessons of Public Liberty: A Comment on Holmes’s Jorde Lecture, 97 CALIF. L.
REV. 407, 414 (2009).
349. Protect America Act § 2.
350. See id.
351. Id. § 6.
352. Eric Lichtblau, More Sharp Words Traded over Lapsed Wiretap Law,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/23/washington/
23fisa.html.
353. Id.
354. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 
(2008). Section 201 of the 2008 Act reinstated the immunity provisions. Id. § 201.
Those provisions are codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1885-1885c (2012). At the end of 
2012, Congress extended for an additional five years certain provisions of the 2008 
amendments that otherwise would have been subject to sunset provisions on 
December 31, 2012. FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 2012, Pub. L. 
No. 112-238, 126 Stat. 1631 (2012).
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Prior to recent FISA amendments, FISA remained the 
“exclusive means” for conducting foreign-intelligence surveillance 
by the executive branch; however, in the 2008 FISA amendments, 
Congress included ECPA and other federal statutes with FISA as the 
“exclusive means” for conducting foreign-intelligence 
surveillance.355 In part, this FISA amendment was a response to the 
unpopular and much criticized TSP, and served as a congressional 
attempt to eliminate warrantless wiretapping by the executive 
branch.
C. The National Security Agency and Edward Snowden
You are being watched. The government has a secret system, a machine 
that spies on you every hour of every day. I know because I built it. I
designed the machine to detect acts of terror but it sees everything. Violent 
crimes involving ordinary people, people like you. Crimes the government 
considered “irrelevant.” They wouldn’t act, so I decided I would. But I 
needed a partner, someone with the skills to intervene. Hunted by the 
authorities, we work in secret. You’ll never find us, but victim or 
perpetrator, if your number’s up . . . we’ll find *you*.356
Early in the Obama administration, which began in January 
2009, there was reason to believe that the executive branch was 
continuing the Bush administration’s warrantless wiretapping in 
some form.357 This suspicion was confirmed with Edward Snowden’s 
leak of NSA information during the summer of 2013.358
As revealed over the summer of 2013 and into the fall, public 
knowledge of government activity under the ECPA and FISA is just 
the tip of the iceberg concerning government surveillance of 
Americans. An anti-secrecy blog author noted, “Already we’ve seen 
a more extensive disclosure of classified information about current 
intelligence programs than we’ve seen for at least 40 years, and 
355. 50 U.S.C. § 1812.
356. Person of Interest (CBS television broadcast Sept. 22, 2011), available 
at http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1839578/quotes. Actor Kevin Chapman, who plays 
one of the characters in the hit television show, commented on the parallels between 
the show and United States government intelligence, “‘Look at the NSA—they’re 
making us look like a reality show! We’ve been talking about that for three seasons, 
and it’s now just coming to light.’” Ashley Lee, ‘Person of Interest’ Actor Says the 
NSA Is ‘Making Us Look Like a Reality Show,’ HOLLYWOOD REP. (Oct. 4, 2013, 
1:15 PM) (quoting Kevin Chapman), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/
news/person-interest-cast-creator-jonathan-643386.
357. Marc Ambinder, Shut Up: It’s Still a Secret, ATLANTIC (Apr. 7, 2009, 
12:35 PM), http://politics.theatlantic.com/2009/04/shut_up_its_still_a_secret.php.
358. MacAskill, supra note 53.
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maybe ever.”359 The author added, “One revelation led to another, 
just like pulling a thread on a sweater and unraveling an entire 
sleeve.”360
On June 5, 2013, The Guardian broke the news of an April 25, 
2013 FISC order requiring the telecommunications company Verizon 
to provide the NSA with telephone metadata on all calls, whether 
domestic or international; the metadata, considered a business record 
under § 215 of the Patriot Act, includes the telephone numbers of the 
individuals participating in a call, the location of the participants, the 
time of the call, and the duration of the call.361 Within the following 
two days, two newspapers, The Washington Post and The Guardian,
disclosed information on Prism, a program providing access to the 
systems of a number of large Internet companies: Microsoft since 
2007; Yahoo since 2008; Google, Facebook, and PalTalk since 2009; 
YouTube since 2010; Skype and AOL since 2011; and Apple since 
2012.362 Prism allows the NSA to collect data such as the content of 
the user’s emails, audio and video chats, and file transfers as well as 
the user’s search history.363
In addition, NSA uses the Upstream program to collect 
information from the fiber optic cables that form the backbone of the 
Internet.364 The information, which includes communication content 
359. Carrie Johnson, Snowden’s Leaks Lead to More Disclosure from Feds,
NPR (Oct. 11, 2013, 4:00 AM) (quoting Steven Aftergood), 
http://www.npr.org/2013/10/11/231899987/snowdens-leaks-lead-to-more-
disclosure-from-feds.
360. Id. (quoting Carrie Johnson).
361. Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of 
Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order; see A Guardian Guide to 
Your Metadata, GUARDIAN (June 12, 2013, 11:52 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/interactive/2013/jun/12/what-is-metadata-
nsa-surveillance#meta=0000000.
362. Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to 
User Data of Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-
data?guni=Article:in%20body%20link.
363. Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data 
from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-
from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-
cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html; Greenwald & MacAskill, supra note 
362.
364. James Ball, Edward Snowden NSA Files: Secret Surveillance and Our 
Revelations so Far, GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2013, 3:36 PM), 
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as well as metadata, is collected with the cooperation of four 
telecommunications companies that NSA references “by the 
codenames STROMBREW, FAIRVIEW, BLARNEY, and 
OAKSTAR.”365 One computer expert speculated as to the various 
methods that could be employed to access data flowing through the 
cables: “The N.S.A. could physically install a device that clips on 
the cable and listens to electric signals, or insert a splitter in the 
cable through which data would travel.”366 He added that 
“someone with remote login access to the cable’s switch or router 
could also redirect data flowing through the cables.”367
As explained below, NSA obtained access to at least one 
AT&T communications switch, located in San Francisco, in 2002 to 
2003, and reportedly obtained access to other AT&T switches, 
allowing NSA “‘vacuum-cleaner surveillance of all the data crossing 
the internet—whether that be peoples’ e-mail, web surfing or any
other data.’”368 Although that information about the San Francisco 
switch is at least ten years old, NSA access to information traveling 
on fiber optic cables may have continued, with circumstantial 
evidence indicating that the two companies whose cooperation 
allows NSA access to fiber optic cables may be AT&T and 
Verizon.369
Much of the world’s international communications is 
transmitted on a relatively small number of undersea cables.370 In the 
United States, these cables, containing great rivers of 
communications, emerge from the sea floor at approximately half a 
dozen locations on the Atlantic coast and another half a dozen 
locations on the Pacific coast, traveling through telecommunications 
switches before being dispersed to disparate points in the United 
States.371 At some point, NSA gained the cooperation of AT&T to 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/21/edward-snowden-nsa-files-
revelations.
365. Id.
366. Savage, Miller & Perlroth, supra note 71, at B1 (quoting Nicholas 
McKeowen).
367. Id. (quoting Nicholas McKeowen).
368. Justin Elliot, Does the NSA Tap That? What We Still Don’t Know About 
the Agency’s Internet Surveillance, PROPUBLICA (July 22, 2013, 1:41 PM) (quoting 
Mark Klein), http://www.propublica.org/article/what-we-still-dont-know-about-the-
nsa-secret-internet-tapping.
369. Id.
370. JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY: THE ULTRA-SECRET NSA
FROM 9/11 TO THE EAVESDROPPING ON AMERICA 175 (2008).
371. Id. at 176-77.
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install a splitter in the building housing at least one of these switches, 
which was located in San Francisco.372 Equipment installed in the 
building created a mirror image of the flood of communications 
moving through the switch, screened the communications for key 
information, and routed this information to NSA.373 A similar system 
to allow NSA to monitor communications was apparently in place at 
AT&T facilities in other locations.374
AT&T and a number of other telecommunications companies 
have “‘peering’ arrangements” that allow them to cut costs by 
sharing telecommunications cables at various points.375 This allows 
the executive branch to gain access to communications carried by a 
number of telecommunications companies in addition to AT&T. 
Further, because the San Francisco switch carried domestic as well 
as international telecommunications traffic, the splitter installed there 
gave the government access to both domestic and international 
communications flowing through the switch.376
In July 2013, The Guardian disclosed information on 
XKeyscore, a program that allows an NSA analyst to search NSA 
databases containing email content, Facebook chats, and information 
on the online activity of a target by using “selectors” such as an 
individual’s email account, name, telephone number, keywords, 
search terms, websites visited, and metadata.377 NSA analyst 
collection of communications of foreign targets permits access to the 
communications of others in contact with a foreign target.378
In September 2013, The Guardian, The New York Times, and 
ProPublica disclosed that the NSA used a multi-pronged approach to 
evading the encryption of much information traveling on the 
Internet, such as emails, banking, and medical data.379 One approach 
is to infiltrate target computers prior to data being encrypted; a 
second approach is to break encryption codes; a third approach is to 
induce technology companies to allow “back doors” into technology 
products or to take advantage of security flaws in technology 
372. Id. at 188, 190.
373. Id. at 189-90, 193.
374. ERIC LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE
139 (1st Anchor Books ed. 2009) (2008).
375. BAMFORD, supra note 370, at 186.
376. Id. at 194-95.
377. Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects ‘Nearly Everything a 
User Does on the Internet,’ GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013, 8:56 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data.
378. Id.
379. Perlroth, Larson & Shane, supra note 345.
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products; and a final approach is to insert weaknesses into encryption 
standards.380 In addition, the NSA maintains a library of encryption 
keys and is permitted to store encrypted data as long as necessary to 
decipher it; however, there is some encryption that NSA has not 
succeeded in breaking.381
In October 2013, The Washington Post disclosed that the NSA 
had been attempting to identify Tor users and their locations.382 Tor, 
which “originally stood for The Onion Router,” is a network of 
servers scattered across the globe, together with software to 
communicate with the network, providing anonymity to a user to 
communicate and browse the Web.383 Although the NSA apparently 
was unsuccessful in conducting surveillance on communication 
traveling on the Tor network, NSA was successful in learning the 
identity of a small number of Tor users by sending malware to a Tor 
user’s browser.384
In the wake of the Snowden disclosures, FISC released several 
opinions concerning NSA mass surveillance. One opinion, dated 
October 3, 2011, and authored by Judge John D. Bates concerned 
“‘upstream collection’ of Internet communications,” which “refers to 
NSA’s interception of Internet communications as they transit 
[redacted], rather than to acquisitions directly from Internet service 
providers.”385 Judge Bates held that certain NSA targeting and 
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Timothy B. Lee, Everything You Need to Know About the NSA and Tor 
in One FAQ, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/04/everything-you-
need-to-know-about-the-nsa-and-tor-in-one-faq/.
383. Id.
384. Id. For a description of how Tor works, see Eric Geier, How (and Why) 
to Set Up a VPN Today, PCWORLD (Mar. 19, 2013, 3:01 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2030763/how-and-why-to-set-up-a-vpn-today.html.
385. [Redacted], No. [redacted], at 5 & n.3, 81 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011) 
[hereinafter Bates opinion] (declassified and redacted) (footnote omitted), available 
at https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/fisc_opinion_-_unconstitutional_surveillance_
0.pdf.
The Court now understands that each year, NSA’s upstream collection 
likely results in the acquisition of roughly two to ten thousand discrete 
wholly domestic communications that are neither to, from, nor about a 
targeted selector, as well as tens of thousands of other communications 
that are to or from a United States person or a person in the United States 
but that are neither to, from, nor about a targeted selector.
Id. at 72. The opinion and accompanying order were released on August 21, 2013. 
Bill Chappell, Secret Court: NSA Surveillance Program Was Unconstitutional, NPR 
1088 Michigan State Law Review 2014:1035
minimization procedures were unconstitutional and that the 
minimization procedures did not comply with FISA.386 “NSA’s 
collection of MCTs [multiple communications] results in the 
acquisition of a very large number of Fourth Amendment-protected 
communications that have no direct connection to any targeted 
facility and thus do not serve the national security needs underlying 
the Section 702 collection as a whole.”387
Judge Bates recognized that the NSA had been collecting 
Internet data since at least 2008, but that the NSA had delayed until 
2011 in bringing this collection information to the court’s 
attention.388 The judge pointed out that this was not the first time that 
the government had misrepresented its surveillance activities.389 “The 
Court is troubled that the government’s revelations regarding NSA’s 
acquisition of Internet transactions mark the third instance in less 
than three years in which the government has disclosed a substantial 
misrepresentation regarding the scope of a major collection 
program.”390 Judge Bates referenced earlier NSA activities: 
“Contrary to the government’s repeated assurances, NSA had been 
routinely running queries of the metadata using querying terms that 
did not meet the required standard for querying.”391 Judge Bates 
quoted from an earlier opinion of FISC concerning the query 
standard, which “had been ‘so frequently and systemically violated 
that it can fairly be said that this critical element of the overall . . .
regime never functioned effectively.’”392
Another opinion, dated August 29, 2013, and authored by 
Judge Claire V. Eagan,393 concerned NSA collection of telephone 
(Aug. 21, 2013, 4:52 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/08/
21/214212847/nsa-culled-tens-of-thousands-of-u-s-emails-yearly-fisa-opinion-says.
386. Bates opinion, supra note 385, at 80.
387. Id. at 78-79.
388. Id. at 5, 17.
389. Id. at 16 n.14.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. (citation omitted).
393. In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order 
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, at 29 
(FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Eagan opinion] (declassified and redacted), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-09-primary-
order.pdf. The Amended Memorandum Opinion and accompanying Primary Order 
were released on September 17, 2013. Ellen Nakashima, FISA Court Releases 
Opinion Upholding NSA Phone Program, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fisa-court-releases-opinion-
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metadata under section 215 of the Patriot Act.394 Judge Eagan found 
that the NSA collection complied with both the Fourth Amendment 
and with § 215, and that the NSA could formulate a query based on 
“a reasonable, articulable suspicion” that the query term “is 
associated with one of the identified international terrorist 
organizations.”395 Judge Eagan reasoned that the relevance standard 
of § 215 had been met “[b]ecause known and unknown international 
terrorist operatives are using telephone communications, and because 
it is necessary to obtain the bulk collection of a telephone company’s 
metadata to determine those connections between known and 
unknown international terrorist operatives.”396 Judge Eagan 
explained:
Because the subset of terrorist communications is ultimately contained 
within the whole of the metadata produced, but can only be found after the 
production is aggregated and then queried using identifiers determined to 
be associated with identified international terrorist organizations, the 
whole production is relevant to the ongoing investigation out of 
necessity.397
The opinion cited398 to a 1979 United States Supreme Court opinion, 
Smith v. Maryland, in concluding that the government collection of 
telephone metadata was not within the reach of the Fourth 
Amendment.399
In Smith, in affirming the lower court’s conclusion that use of 
the pen register did not constitute a search, the United States 
Supreme Court invoked the third-party doctrine “that a person has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns 
upholding-nsa-phone-program/2013/09/17/66660718-1fd3-11e3-b7d1-
7153ad47b549_story.html.
394. Eagan opinion, supra note 393, at 1-2.
395. Id. at 3, 5.
396. Id. at 18.
397. Id. at 22.
398. Id. at 9.
399. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). Smith v. Maryland was a fairly straightforward 
robbery case in which Smith allegedly grabbed the victim’s pocketbook. Id. at 737. 
After the robbery, the victim received a number of threatening telephone calls from 
someone identifying himself as the robber. Id. Through the victim’s description of 
the alleged robber’s car, a police officer obtained the vehicle license plate number 
and, from that, Smith’s home telephone number. Id. At police request, the telephone 
company installed a pen register at the company’s office to record the numbers 
dialed from Smith’s telephone. Id. After the pen register showed a call from Smith’s 
telephone to the victim’s, the police obtained a search warrant for Smith’s residence. 
Id. Smith filed a motion to suppress claiming that the use of the pen register violated 
his Fourth Amendment right. Id. at 737-38.
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over to third parties.”400 The two dissenting opinions in Smith were 
more cognizant of the intrusive nature of the information that could 
be gleaned from the telephone numbers one calls.401 In his dissent, 
Justice Stewart stated: 
I doubt there are any who would be happy to have broadcast to the world a 
list of the local or long distance numbers they have called. This is not 
because such a list might in some sense be incriminating, but because it 
easily could reveal the identities of the persons and the places called, and 
thus reveal the most intimate details of a person’s life.402
In his dissent in Smith, Justice Marshall was even more adamant in 
emphasizing the intrusiveness of pen-register information:
The prospect of unregulated governmental monitoring will undoubtedly 
prove disturbing even to those with nothing illicit to hide. Many 
individuals, including members of unpopular political organizations or 
journalists with confidential sources, may legitimately wish to avoid 
disclosure of their personal contacts. Permitting governmental access to 
telephone records on less than probable cause may thus impede certain 
forms of political affiliation and journalistic endeavor that are the hallmark 
of a truly free society. Particularly given the Government’s previous 
reliance on warrantless telephonic surveillance to trace reporters’ sources 
and monitor protected political activity, I am unwilling to insulate use of 
pen registers from independent judicial review.403
In addition, the dissent in the lower court in Smith brought up the 
potential for government abuse that the nation had most recently 
observed during the Watergate era:
The majority fails to give due weight to the impact of Watergate and its 
progeny, the recent revelations of illicit surveillance conducted by the 
F.B.I. upon activities of various civil rights, labor and political leaders, or 
indeed, the potential abuse to which the pen register may be put by police 
authorities. These factors and others have created an environment of 
distrust, fear and lack of confidence.404
400. Id. at 743-44.
401. Id. at 747-48 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Id. at 751 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).
402. Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
403. Id. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citations 
omitted).
404. Smith v. State, 389 A.2d 858, 874 (Md. 1978) (Cole, J., dissenting) 
(footnote omitted). The dissent also foreshadowed NSA study of social networks. 
“The pen register also has the potential of inhibiting freedom of association. If pen-
register data were fed into a central computer on a widespread basis, patterns of 
acquaintances and dealings among a substantial group of people would be available 
to the government.” Id. at 874 n.4.
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On December 16, 2013, a United States district court judge for 
the District of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction to two 
individual plaintiffs challenging the government’s collection of 
telephone metadata on Fourth Amendment grounds.405 In 
distinguishing Smith v. Maryland, the judge stated:
When do present-day circumstances—the evolutions in the Government’s 
surveillance capabilities, citizens’ phone habits, and the relationship 
between the NSA and telecom companies—become so thoroughly unlike 
those considered by the Supreme Court thirty-four years ago that a 
precedent like Smith simply does not apply? The answer, unfortunately for 
the Government, is now.406
On December 27, 2013, a United States district court judge for the 
Southern District of New York denied a similar motion for 
preliminary injunction, finding that the government’s collection of 
metadata did not violate the Fourth Amendment.407 In so doing, the 
judge found Smith controlling: “Clear precedent applies because 
Smith held that a subscriber has no legitimate expectation of privacy 
in telephony metadata created by third parties.”408
IV. LARGE WORLD BUSINESS CONSEQUENCES
“I have been forced to make a difficult decision: to become complicit in 
crimes against the American people or walk away from nearly 10 years of 
hard work by shutting down Lavabit. . . . After significant soul searching, I 
have decided to suspend operations.”409
In 1978, when Congress first adopted FISA, its intent was to 
place significant restrictions on the executive branch’s authority to 
405. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9-10 (D.D.C. 2013) (order 
granting preliminary injunction).
406. Id. at 31.
407. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 730 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (order denying preliminary injunction).
408. Id. at 752. “Bulk telephony metadata collection under FISA is subject to 
extensive oversight by all three branches of government. It is monitored by the 
Department of Justice, the intelligence Community, the FISC, and Congress.” Id. at 
732. In addition, “[s]ince the initiation of the program, a number of compliance and 
implementation issues were discovered and self-reported by the Government to the 
FISC and Congress.” Id.
409. This was the message posted by the owner of Edward Snowden’s email 
service provider when shutting Lavabit. Kevin Poulsen, Edward Snowden’s E-Mail 
Provider Defied FBI Demands to Turn Over Crypto Keys, Documents Show, WIRED 
(Oct. 2, 2013, 5:27 PM) (quoting Ladar Levison), http://www.wired.com/
threatlevel/2013/10/lavabit_unsealed/; see infra notes 489-495 and accompanying 
text.
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conduct domestic surveillance, not enlarge the powers available to 
the President.410 Likewise, when Congress enacted the original NSL 
statutes, telephone companies and banks served as the contemplated 
recipients for these limited information requests allowable only in
very narrowly defined situations.411 There is more than a little irony 
in the fact that both FISA and NSLs began as protective devices to 
ensure individual privacies and limit government intrusion, and 
today, both have morphed into something quite different from their 
predecessors. It is of little surprise that many of the consequences 
that now threaten American businesses were unimaginable over three 
decades ago when the government first introduced these tools, and 
when considered through the “small-world” theory of networking, 
these consequences have an impact with a magnitude wholly 
incomprehensible in 1978. 
The business consequences of the government’s domestic-
surveillance practices in the last decade include a laundry list of costs 
exacted by federal authorities, not the least of which is the expense 
of complying with authorities’ requests for information. Often, these 
requests are voluminous, requiring days and weeks to compile and 
copy, necessitating countless demands on human capital as well. All 
expenses related to complying with federal requests are the 
responsibility of the business under demand to disclose information. 
The government’s use of its domestic-surveillance tools may also 
undermine the ethical and contractual privacy obligations a business 
owes its clients and customers. A business that receives government 
demands for information or, at worst, becomes an actual surveillance 
target risks loss of clients or customers. If customers do not leave 
they may choose to withhold vital information fearing its disclosure. 
Commercial enterprises may suffer damage to their firms’ goodwill 
or reputation. Some government requests may actually be in conflict 
with foreign-data-protection laws and result in a domestic business’s 
violation of those foreign regulations.412
Many consequences were, perhaps, predictable in 2001 when 
Congress piloted the Patriot Act into law, but contemplating the 
410. See supra Subsection II.B.2.
411. See JULIAN SANCHEZ, LEASHING THE SURVEILLANCE STATE: HOW TO 
REFORM PATRIOT ACT SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITIES, POLICY ANALYSIS 10 (2011),
available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA675.pdf.
412. See Andrew Charlesworth, Europe’s New Data Protection Laws Will 
Cause Conflict with the US, Warn Legal Experts, COMPUTING NEWS (Mar. 23, 
2012), http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2162386/europe-s-protection-laws-
cause-conflict-warn-legal-experts. 
Guilty by Association 1093
statute’s impact on American businesses was not then a priority.413 In 
October 2001, the nation was singularly focused on combating 
terrorism.414 The open wounds still exposed from 9/11 and the 
pervasive fear of multiple home-front attacks produced a national 
climate that welcomed the notions of expanded federal surveillance 
authority, increased penalties for individuals believed to be 
associated with terror-related acts, and enhanced policing strategies 
to prevent conduct that could lead to terrorist attacks.415 The 
proponents of the Patriot Act described the proposed legislation as 
necessary to equip the U.S. government with the tools it required to 
combat terrorism.416 With little dissent and an absence of 
consideration of any commercial ramifications, the Patriot Act 
became law.417
More than ten years removed since its adoption, opposition to 
the Patriot Act is growing, as numerous state and local governments, 
civil liberties groups, and business organizations418 battle to limit the 
breadth of the legislation. The conflict between Americans’ civil 
liberties and the nation’s domestic-surveillance practices authorized 
by the Patriot Act have received and are continuing to receive 
significant attention. Unfortunately, examinations of the hardships 
imposed upon the average American business by the Patriot Act’s 
domestic-surveillance powers are far less numerous, and until the 
start of the Snowden disclosures, almost non-existent was 
consideration of the government’s use of domestic surveillance of 
businesses and their employees to map citizens’ social networks. 
413. See supra Section II.D.
414. See supra Section II.D.
415. See supra Section II.D.
416. See supra Section II.D.
417. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 372 (2001). 
418. See Michael Sniffen, Major Business Groups Split with Bush 
Administration over Patriot Act, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 6, 2005), 
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/1006-06.htm. The first organized 
criticism of the Patriot Act from the business sector included the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the National 
Association of Realtors, all frequently named in Forbes’ list of twenty-five most 
influential lobbying entities. Id. These groups and others opposed the Bush 
Administration supporting amendments that would require investigators to explain 
how the information requested is linked to individuals suspected of terrorism and 
that would allow businesses to challenge the government’s requests in courts. Id.
The business sector also campaigned for the removal of the gag orders associated 
with administrative demands for information. Id.
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A. Business-Records Requests
With the passage of the Patriot Act in 2001, Congress included 
the business-records provision, § 215, and greatly expanded the 
scope of the FBI’s investigative authority concerning business 
records.419 The original business-records provision limited the FBI’s 
reach to request records from only those four types of entities or 
businesses outlined by statute.420 Section 215 removed all such 
limitations relative to the types of entities or businesses who could be 
subject to a records request.421 In addition, the new amendment 
simultaneously lowered the standard of proof necessary to obtain 
business records and dramatically enlarged the categories of 
documents that the FBI can attain under this FISA provision.422 The 
pertinent part of § 215 provides:
[T]he Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a designee of the 
Director (whose rank shall be no lower than Assistant Special Agent in 
Charge) may make an application for an order requiring the production of 
any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and 
other items) for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information 
not concerning a United States person or to protect against international 
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such 
investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the 
basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.423
The Patriot Act amendment to FISA’s business-records provision 
authorizes the FBI to compel any type of business to produce “any 
tangible things.”424 Now, the FBI’s request need not be related to a 
person whom the FBI is investigating.425 Rather, the request for 
records need only be associated with “an authorized 
investigation . . . conducted in accordance with [applicable law and 
guidelines] . . . to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities.”426 This is known as the 
419. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2012).
420. 50 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (1998).
421. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2012).
422. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (1998), with 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) 
(2012).
423. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). The “United States
person” is defined as a citizen, legal permanent resident, an unincorporated 
association in which a “substantial number” of members are citizens or legal 
permanent residents, or a corporation incorporated in the United States as long as 
such association or corporation is not itself a “foreign power.” Id. § 1801(i).
424. Id. § 1861(a)(1).
425. Id. § 1861(b)(2).
426. Id.
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“relevance standard” and allows the FBI to request information 
concerning persons not under investigation but who may have a 
connection to someone or some entity that is under investigation.427
Librarians were among the most vocal critics of § 215.428
Although the FBI asserts that it has not used § 215 to demand 
records from libraries, librarians suggest otherwise.429 Unfortunately, 
the gag provisions of § 215 prohibit the disclosure of all such 
requests.430 The protestations of § 215 by librarians earned the 
business-records provision a new name. It is now most often referred 
to as the “library” provision.431 The library provision has proven to 
be one of the more contentious measures debated in the Patriot Act, 
and much concern has been voiced over the expansiveness of the 
FBI’s authority to request private information with no meaningful 
judicial oversight.432
Section 215 business-records requests, for instance, received 
early criticism because it allowed the federal government access to 
private records, more particularly “any tangible thing,” previously 
inaccessible without a subpoena or other court order.433 If requested, 
businesses must now produce customers’ personal data, transaction 
records, account histories, and even genetic information.434 Under 
FISA, if law enforcement represents that the request is “relevant to 
an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism 
or clandestine intelligence activities,”435 the judge has no discretion 
and must approve the request.436 The recipient business must comply 
with the request, with little or no meaningful mechanism to challenge 
427. Id.
428. Paul Coggins, It Doesn’t Stay in Vegas: National Security Letters 
Under the PATRIOT Act Pose a Significant Threat to U.S. Business, LEGAL TIMES 
(Mar. 27, 2006), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=900005449669? .
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. See id.; see also Michael J. Woods, Counterintelligence and Access to 
Transactional Records: A Practical History of USA PATRIOT Act Section 215, 1 J.
NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 37, 57-58 (2005).
433. Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Says Justice Dept.’s PATRIOT Act 
Website Creates New Myths About Controversial Law, ACLU (Aug. 26, 2003), 
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/patriot/16760prs20030826.html.
434. Id.
435. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a)-(b) (2012). 
436. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1) (2012).
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a request.437 FISA court proceedings are closed, meaning neither the 
business owner nor her counsel is allowed access.438
Initially, the burden on American business is a significant 
increase in both the direct and the indirect costs to a business.439 It is 
the responsibility of the recipient to provide the labor, management, 
materials, supplies, and anything else necessary to fulfill a Section 
215 Order for Business Records, not to mention the necessity of 
some businesses being forced to hire additional employees to address 
government requests.440 Additional employees require additional 
oversight, further straining management demands. The direct costs 
associated with large requests can be astronomical, with the security 
industry estimated to spend $700 million over the first few years.441
Large security firms are estimated to spend $25 million to $30 
million each.442 These issues are compounded given the lack of 
meaningful judicial oversight that increases the likelihood of 
frivolous and counterproductive requests by law enforcement.443
The constitutionality of § 215 continues to seek challenges 
through litigation leaving companies vulnerable to suit from 
customers whose information the company has revealed.444
Increasing numbers of § 215 requests only serve to increase a 
company’s exposure.445 Firms are also exposed to lawsuits advocacy 
groups may bring on behalf of customers who feel their civil liberties 
and privacy have been violated by the company’s disclosure.446 By 
437. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a).
438. Breglio, supra note 243, at 188-90.
439. Tamara Loomis, The Rising Costs of Patriot Act Compliance, LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER (June 24, 2003), 
http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=900005389398?.
440. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a).
441. Loomis, supra note 439.
442. Id.
443. See Breglio, supra note 243, at 190.
444. See id. at 190-91.
445. After Congress amended FISA in 1998, authorizing the business-
records provision, and prior to the passage of the Patriot Act in 2001, the FBI made 
only one FISA request for business records. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S USE OF SECTION 215 ORDERS FOR 
BUSINESS RECORDS IN 2006, at 8 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/
oig/special/s0803a/final.pdf. The number of requests picked up thereafter, with 
thirty-six § 215 applications processed between 2002 and 2006 (including fifteen 
applications processed in 2006). Id. at 15.
446. BILL OF RIGHTS DEF. COMM., THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND AMERICAN 
BUSINESS: WHAT YOU CAN DO TO PROTECT YOUR BUSINESS AND YOUR CLIENTS’
PRIVACY 4 (2008).
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complying with government requests for information, businesses 
undermine both their ethical and contractual privacy obligations to 
their clients and customers.447 In addition to litigation, companies 
risk customers’ withholding of information.448 Fear of exposure may 
prompt customers to withhold data needed by the business for 
general operations, customer service, retention, and marketing.449
There are additional risks for companies conducting business 
overseas. In the world of global commerce, an American firm could
find itself in conflict with foreign-data-protection laws.450 Violation 
of these international regulations would place a business in the 
unenviable position of suffering higher legal costs, lost business, and 
most assuredly, damage to the firm’s goodwill or brand reputation.451
B. National-Security Letters
An NSL is quite simply a form letter demanding third parties 
provide information to the requesting enforcement agency.452 Major 
congressional consideration dedicated to NSLs occurred in 2001, 
with the enactment of § 505 of the Patriot Act.453 Section 505 
expanded the FBI’s NSL authority when requesting communications 
records, financial records, and credit agency records.454 Congress 
justified its dramatic enlargement of the FBI’s NSL provision as a 
means of “streamlin[ing] the process of obtaining NSL authority.”455
First, the Patriot Act amendments reduce the level of administrative 
certification required for NSL requests.456 Now, rather than requiring 
a high-ranking official at FBI headquarters to certify an NSL request, 
NSLs certified by agents in charge of field offices suffice.457 The 
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. One author describes NSLs as “formal demands to surrender certain 
records and refrain from disclosing the fact of the request.” Andrew E. Nieland, 
Note, National Security Letters and the Amended Patriot Act, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
1201, 1201 (2007); see 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (2012).
453. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505, 115 Stat. 272, 365 
(2001) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)).
454. Id.
455. Administration’s Draft Anti-terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 57 (2001) (consultation draft).
456. USA PATRIOT Act, § 505.
457. Id. E.g., compare 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) after the amendment by § 505 
(“The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or his designee in a position 
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second change of note is Congress’s substitution of a relevancy 
standard for the earlier “reason to believe” standard.458 The change 
allows an FBI agent to issue a demand for information upon internal 
certification that the information sought is “relevant to an authorized 
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities.”459 A third revision expands the population of 
individuals whose records may be requested.460 Section 505 
eliminates the requirement that NSLs address only those records of 
an individual engaged in international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities or an individual who is or is in communication 
with a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.461 Finally, the 
Patriot Act amendments authorize records requests of American 
citizens in connection with FBI investigations, so long as the 
investigation is not based solely on the exercise of First Amendment 
rights.462
Through the Patriot Act, Congress also created a new NSL 
provision providing other federal agencies with NSL authority 
comparable to that held by the FBI.463 Subsection 358(g) of the 
Patriot Act adds a section within the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
authorizing any agency that “conduct[s] investigations of, or 
intelligence or counterintelligence activities or analysis related to, 
international terrorism”464 to issue an NSL request for “a consumer 
report . . . and all other information in a consumer’s file.”465 The new 
NSL section includes both a non-disclosure466 and an immunity 
provision,467 but, again, fails to delineate any means of enforcement 
not lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent 
in Charge in a Bureau field office designated by the Director . . . .”), with 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2709(b) prior to the amendment by § 505 (“The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, or his designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant 
Director . . . .”).
458. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (after the amendment by § 505), with 18
U.S.C. § 2709(b) (prior to the amendment by § 505).
459. Id. § 2709(b)(1).
460. Compare id. § 2709(b) (after the amendment by § 505), with id.
§ 2709(b) (prior to the amendment by § 505). 
461. Id. § 2709(b)(2).
462. Id. § 2709(b).
463. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681v(a) (2012).
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Id. § 1681v(c).
467. Id. § 1681v(e).
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or penalties for the improper disclosure of an agency’s request for 
information under the section.468
Few can doubt the laudability of preventing terrorism, but the 
post-9/11 tools facilitating domestic surveillance thwart effective 
oversight and promote opportunities for abuse. The increase in § 215 
requests has been significant since the Patriot Act’s passage. While 
this is certainly the case with § 215 business-record requests,469 it is 
even more pervasive with NSLs.470 The Patriot Act amendments to 
§ 505 addressing NSLs removed the requirement that issuing 
agencies present “specific and articulable facts giving reason to 
468. Id. § 1681v(c).
469. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 445, at 8, 15.
470. Pursuant to the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act 
of 2005, the Department of Justice’s Inspector General conducted two reviews of the 
FBI’s use of NSLs. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A
REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
LETTERS 1 (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0703b/final.pdf. 
The first review examined calendar years 2003 through 2005 and culminated in a 
report issued in early March 2007. Id. The Inspector General’s review reported a 
drastic increase in the number of NSL requests, increasing from 8,500 in 2002, to 
39,000 in 2003, to 56,000 in 2004, and to 47,000 in 2005. Id. at xvi. In addition, the 
number of NSL requests reported to Congress was inaccurate because of several 
flaws in the method of collection. Id. at xvi-xvii. The review estimated that some 
8,850 NSL requests for 2003 through 2005, amounting to approximately 6% of the 
requests, were not included in the database. Id. at xvii.
Investigations of Americans also increased from approximately 39% in 
2003 to approximately 53% in 2005. Id. at xx. The report also noted that a 
substantial majority of the FBI’s requests pertained to telephone and email 
communications. Id. at xviii.
[W]e found that that [sic] the FBI used NSLs in violation of applicable 
NSL statutes, Attorney General Guidelines, and internal FBI policies. In 
addition, we found that the FBI circumvented the requirements of the 
ECPA NSL statute when it used at least 739 “exigent letters” to obtain 
telephone toll billing records and subscriber information from three 
telephone companies without first issuing NSLs. 
Id. at 124. The second Inspector General report examined calendar year 2006 and 
was issued in March 2008. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS: ASSESSMENT 
OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND EXAMINATION OF NSL USAGE IN 2006, at 1 (2008), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0803b/final.pdf. The second 
examination pays particular attention to the corrective measures taken by the FBI 
following the Inspector General’s first report. Id. at 6-8. The 2006 review revealed 
that NSL requests continued to increase to 49,425 in 2006, a 4.7% increase over the 
prior year, and a total of 192,499 for 2003 through 2006. Id. at 9. The report 
concluded that it was premature to determine whether the corrective measures will 
resolve the pervasive problems identified in the prior report and issued additional 
recommendations. Id. at 161-63.
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believe that the person or entity to whom the information sought 
pertains is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”471 The 
objective was to remove obstacles that would prevent the federal 
government from obtaining personal records, such as financial 
records, Internet-communication-transaction records, telephone 
records, and other information, that could assist in preventing a 
terrorist act. After October 2001, all that is required for a government 
agency to obtain personal confidential information is a form letter
presented to any business requesting information relevant to an 
ongoing investigation.472
NSLs require no judicial oversight, which significantly 
increases the potential for frivolous and counterproductive requests 
by law enforcement.473 Similar to § 215 business-records requests, 
companies must take time and resources away from their normal 
operations to gather data to provide information and records to 
requesting agencies.474 The direct and indirect costs are substantial.475
Just as is the case with § 215, it is the responsibility of the recipient 
to provide the labor, management, materials, supplies, and anything 
else necessary to comply with the § 505/NSL demand.476
Like § 215, by complying with NSL requests for information, 
businesses undermine both their ethical and contractual privacy 
obligations to their clients and customers.477 Again, businesses face 
the threat of litigation, as well as withholding of information by 
customers.478 The same fear of exposure presented in § 215 is present 
with NSLs and may prompt customers to withhold data needed by 
the business for general operations, customer service, retention, and 
marketing.479 The following paragraphs provide two examples of 
NSL requests that placed serious strains on businesses.
In the first example, hotels and casinos in Las Vegas, Nevada, 
served as the unwitting subjects of an intensive and invasive data-
mining operation conducted by the FBI through NSLs.480 In 
471. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (2012).
472. See supra notes 452-62 and accompanying text.
473. BILL OF RIGHTS DEF. COMM., supra note 446, at 5.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Nieland, supra note 452, at 1213.
477. BILL OF RIGHTS DEF. COMM., supra note 446, at 5.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Barton Gellman, The FBI’s Secret Scrutiny: In Hunt for Terrorists, 
Bureau Examines Records of Ordinary Americans, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/05/AR2005110501
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December 2003, information revealed that Las Vegas was a potential 
target for a New Year’s Eve terror attack.481 The FBI began 
requesting information from Las Vegas businesses on everyone who 
would be staying in a hotel, renting a vehicle, leasing storage space, 
or arriving by airplane during the two weeks prior to New Year’s 
Day.482 Although some businesses complied immediately with the 
FBI’s request, many prominent casino properties refused to disclose 
the information.483 To compel disclosure, FBI agents issued NSLs 
requesting massive amounts of sensitive information.484 Unable to 
challenge the NSL demands, casino executives were left no choice 
but to produce the records, and the information provided more data 
for the FBI’s permanent databases.485 The amount of data demanded 
by the FBI was so extensive that some Las Vegas properties feared 
closure would be required in order to comply with the requests.486
The second example followed the Snowden disclosures. The 
aftermath of the Snowden disclosures apparently resulted in Lavabit, 
Snowden’s email service provider, closing its business after fighting 
compliance with an NSL.487 In contrast to other email service 
providers, a Lavabit customer could encrypt incoming emails with a 
secret encryption key known to the customer but not to the service 
provider.488 Thus, government access to emails of a Lavabit customer 
was dependent on government knowledge of the customer’s 
encryption key. On August 1, 2013, a federal district judge ordered 
the service provider to turn over the encryption keys that would 
366_pf.html. Information gained through NSLs can be used by the government for 
“contact chaining,” “link analysis,” and “data mining,” enabling a study of social 
networks. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “‘Starting with your bad guy and
his telephone number and looking at who he’s calling, and [then] who they’re 
calling,’ the number of people surveilled ‘goes up exponentially,’ acknowledged 
Caproni, the FBI’s general counsel.” Id. (quoting Valerie Caproni). After the Patriot 
Act, Attorney General Ashcroft “directed the FBI to develop ‘data mining’ 
technology to probe for hidden links among the people in its growing cache of 
electronic files.” Id. Data mining allows the government to scour already-gathered 
information to study social networks; “[d]ata mining intensifies the impact of 
national security letters, because anyone’s personal files can be scrutinized again 
and again without a fresh need to establish relevance.” Id.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. See id.
487. Poulsen, supra note 409.
488. Id.
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allow the government access to the emails of all Lavabit customers 
rather than just the target’s emails.489
The federal government had first requested pen-register 
information on one Lavabit user and, later, the encryption key that 
would permit the government access to the encrypted emails of all 
Lavabit customers.490 Levison equated the government’s request for 
the encryption key to “‘asking Coca-Cola to hand over its secret 
formula.’”491 On August 2, 2013, Ladar Levison, the Lavabit owner, 
provided the government with an eleven-page print document, 
printed in four-point-size font, containing “five, 2,560 SSL 
encryption keys.”492 Recognizing that the encryption keys were 
almost illegible in that form, the judge ordered Lavabit to provide the 
government with the encryption keys in electronic form or risk a fine 
of $5,000 per day.493 Levison closed his business on August 8, 2013, 
rather than comply and appealed the district judge’s decision to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.494 Levinson 
commented, “‘How as a small business do you hire the lawyers to 
appeal this and change public opinion to get the laws changed when 
Congress doesn’t even know what is going on?’”495
Earlier in the year, in In re National Security Letter an
unnamed electronic communication service provider successfully 
challenged the FBI’s request for subscriber information and the 
related requirement prohibiting the provider from disclosing 
information regarding the request.496 The court noted that few NSL 
recipients have contested the NSL disclosure restrictions even 
though nondisclosure orders accompany some 97% of the NSLs.497
The district court held “that the nondisclosure provision of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2709(c) violates the First Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3511(b)(2) 
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Nicole Perlroth & Scott Shane, As F.B.I. Pursued Snowden, an E-Mail 
Service Stood Firm, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2013) (quoting Ladar Levison), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/03/us/snowdens-e-mail-provider-discusses-
pressure-from-fbi-to-disclose-data.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&.
492. Eyder Peralta, How Snowden’s Email Provider Tried to Foil the FBI 
Using Tiny Font, NPR (Oct. 3, 2013, 9:07 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2013/10/03/228878659/how-snowdens-email-provider-tried-to-foil-the-fbi-
using-tiny-font.
493. Perlroth & Shane, supra note 491.
494. Poulsen, supra note 409.
495. Perlroth & Shane, supra note 491 (quoting Ladar Levison).
496. See 930 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1065-67 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
497. Id. at 1074.
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and (b)(3) violate the First Amendment and separation of powers 
principles” and imposed an injunction forbidding the government 
from issuing other NSLs or from enforcing nondisclosure 
provisions.498
In reaching this holding, the court was troubled by the First 
Amendment concerns that the statutory authority for NSLs do not 
limit their duration and that “the NSL nondisclosure provisions are 
not narrowly tailored on their face [to serve a compelling 
governmental interest], since they apply, without distinction, to both 
the content of the NSLs and to the very fact of having received 
one.”499 As far as separation of powers was concerned, the court 
found that “the statute impermissibly attempts to circumscribe a 
court’s ability to review the necessity of nondisclosure orders.”500
The court explained:
As written, the statute expressly limits a court’s powers to modify or set 
aside a nondisclosure order to situations where there is “no reason to 
believe” that disclosure “may” lead to an enumerated harm; and if a 
specified official has certified that such a harm “may” occur, that 
determination is “conclusive.” The statute’s intent—to circumscribe a 
court’s ability to modify or set aside nondisclosure NSLs unless the 
essentially insurmountable standard “no reason to believe” that a harm 
“may” result is satisfied—is incompatible with the court’s duty to 
searchingly test restrictions on speech.501
The risks associated with conducting businesses overseas are 
present with NSLs as well. An American firm could, again, find 
itself in conflict with foreign-data-protection laws. Just as is true 
with § 215 business-records requests, violation of these international 
regulations could subject a business to “higher legal costs, lost 
498. Id. at 1081. The court added “given the significant constitutional and 
national security issues at stake, enforcement of the Court’s judgment will be stayed 
pending appeal, or if no appeal is filed, for 90 days.” Id.
499. Id. at 1075. The court explained:
This pervasive use of nondisclosure orders, coupled with the government’s 
failure to demonstrate that a blanket prohibition on recipients’ ability to 
disclose the mere fact of receipt of an NSL is necessary to serve the 
compelling need of national security, creates too large a danger that 
speech is being unnecessarily restricted.
Id. at 1076.
500. Id. at 1077.
501. Id. at 1077-78. “Courts necessarily give significant deference to the 
government’s national security determinations. However, that deference must be 
based on a reasoned explanation from an official that directly supports the assertion 
of national security interests.” Id. at 1078 (footnote omitted).
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business, and damage to [the firm’s] goodwill or brand 
reputation.”502
C. Small-World Theory
In our view, the bulk collection and aggregation of Americans’ phone 
records has a significant impact on Americans’ privacy that exceeds the 
issues considered by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland. That 
decision was based on the technology of the rotary-dial era and did not 
address the type of ongoing, broad surveillance of phone records that the 
government is now conducting. These records can reveal personal 
relationships, family medical issues, political and religious affiliations, 
and a variety of other private personal information. This is particularly 
true if these records are collected in a manner that includes cell phone 
locational data, effectively turning Americans’ cell phones into tracking 
devices. We are concerned that officials have told the press that the 
collection of this location data is currently authorized.503
This Article suggests that Milgram’s small-world theory 
presents additional indirect costs exacted from FISA surveillance, 
§ 215 business requests, and § 505 NSLs, and that these costs have 
not yet been closely examined. Over the last forty years, Milgram’s 
hypotheses and experiments have provided intriguing fodder for 
literary works,504 dinner conversations, and parlor games.505
Determining who may be connected to whom and through whom 
proffers entertaining aspects, none of which were lost on Milgram. 
There are, however, potentially sobering implications of Milgram’s 
small-world studies meriting consideration by American businesses 
given the current trend of our nation’s domestic-surveillance 
practices. For instance, the significance for Milgram of the small-
world problem rested in his theory that a network structure underlies 
society.506 He conjectured that there exists an underlying connective 
502. BILL OF RIGHTS DEF. COMM., supra note 446, at 4, 5.
503. Letter from twenty-six United States Senators to James R. Clapper, U.S. 
Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence 1 (June 27, 2013), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/28/senators-letter-james-
clapper.
504. See GUARE, supra note 29.
505. Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon is another social connectivity game that 
gained great popularity on college campuses in the late 1990s. Players attempt to 
link the actor Kevin Bacon to some other actor through films in which they both 
appeared or through a chain of co-stars in different films but with whom both Bacon 
and the target appeared. The goal is to link Bacon directly or indirectly with the 
target actor through as few common films or co-stars as possible. See CRAIG FASS,
MIKE GINELLI & BRIAN TURTLE, SIX DEGREES OF KEVIN BACON (1996).
506. Milgram, supra note 26, at 63.
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network comprised of two small worlds.507 The first, the actual small 
world, is the realm in which two individuals unknowingly share a 
connection.508 Arguably, this is the realm most people inhabit—a
domain in which individuals are rarely cognizant of everyone to 
whom and through whom they are connected and even less aware of 
the multiple, far-reaching networks they populate.509 The second is 
the actualized small world in which two individuals anticipate, 
research, and discover their connection—the sphere that gave birth to 
the cliché “it’s a small world.”510
Using Milgram’s example, Fred Jones and an Englishman meet 
for the first time by happenstance at a café in Tunis; the two engage 
in light conversational banter; and they pass away a moment in time 
together while they dine.511 Not a unique occurrence, similar chance 
meetings occur countless times each day around the globe. The realm 
shared by these individuals portrays Milgram’s actual small world in 
which someone like Jones and another, not unlike the Englishman, 
regardless of their relationship or lack thereof, share a connection 
that has not been revealed to or recognized by either.512 The 
association they unknowingly share is part of a connective network 
of which they are both participants in an actual small world.513
Milgram’s sketch continues, and Jones learns that the 
Englishman has spent some time in Detroit.514 Jones inquires whether 
the Englishman knows his friend Ben Arkadian.515 The Englishman 
recognizes the name, describes Arkadian, and receives confirmation 
that the individual recalled is, indeed, the Arkadian about whom 
Jones is inquiring.516 Both gentlemen have discovered that they share 
an association through Arkadian. At the point Jones and the 
Englishman discover the mutual acquaintance and the link among 
them is revealed, the actual realm in which they exist transforms into 
Milgram’s actualized small world. By chance, Milgram’s two 
strangers became more aware of their connectedness to each other 
507. Id. at 62. “[W]hile persons X and Z may not know each other directly, 
they may share a mutual acquaintance—that is, a person who knows both of 
them.” Id.
508. Id. at 61-63.
509. Id. at 62.
510. Id. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted).
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id. at 62.
514. Id. at 61.
515. Id.
516. Id.
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through their mutual acquaintance and, hence, more aware of the 
underlying network of which they each provide a node and share 
linkages.517
Milgram sought to uncover the connections that define the 
structure underlying both of the dimensions he denominated as actual 
(unknown connectivity) and actualized (known connectivity) small 
worlds.518 One of Milgram’s objectives was to determine how 
individuals are connected within the networks existing in society, 
thus identifying an individual’s friends and acquaintances.519 Another 
larger objective of the small-world experiments was to determine the 
forces within society that connect, inform, and influence an 
individual’s network.520 The realization came later of just how little 
any particular individual knows and appreciates of the networks of 
which he is a part.521
The United States, too, is interested in who may be connected 
to whom and through whom. This Article suggests that the executive 
branch shares Milgram’s objectives in at least this respect—to 
determine how individuals may be connected to terrorist cells and 
their accompanying plots to cause injury and destruction. In the War 
on Terror, the United States actively seeks to identify and neutralize 
national-security threats. The executive branch and the federal law 
enforcement agencies within that branch employ techniques that help 
determine the forces that connect, inform, and influence terrorists 
and their organizations. Information gathered through FISA 
surveillance, § 215 business-records requests, and NSLs inform the 
FBI and make their analyses possible. Government officials are 
actively employing techniques to use this information to determine, 
at a minimum, who is connected to terrorism and what influences 
those connections, but the information, once collected, is there to 
make other connections as well.522 Most of us need not be worried 
that government officials will wrongfully identify us as connected to 
terrorists because we are not of a race, religion, or nationality that the 
counterterrorism investigations might consider inherently suspicious; 
however, if concern is warranted, it lies in the fact that the executive 
517. Id.
518. Kathryn James, Six Degrees of Information Seeking: Stanley Milgram 
and the Small World of the Library, 32 J. ACAD. LIBRARIANSHIP 527, 527-28 (2006).
519. Milgram, supra note 26, at 62.
520. James, supra note 518, at 527.
521. Milgram, supra note 26, at 66.
522. See Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective 
Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 429, 437-43 (2011).
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branch has the capacity to monitor every transaction and 
communication of any individual without judicial oversight in its 
attempts. Post-9/11 tools like FISA, § 215, and NSLs ease data 
collection and exponentially increase the administration’s ability to 
conduct monitoring activities. Information gathered through such 
domestic monitoring tools can facilitate linking individuals to 
terrorism. In a small world, the links between any individual and 
terrorism could be as few as between three and four.523
The new goal is to prevent terrorist attacks by interrupting 
terrorist activities in the making. Thus, the government seeks to 
identify terrorist suspects and make them targets before they have the 
opportunity to act.524 Counterterrorism has shifted the goal from 
convicting someone of a crime committed in the past to preventing 
terrorism at almost any cost. Terrorism has supplied a justification 
for government action once believed to be outside the bounds of the 
Constitution. This approach could prove particularly problematic for 
American businesses that may be unaware of all of the individuals, 
entities, and organizations within their small worlds. The 
government, however, has the ability to make connections that are 
beyond a firm’s capacity. Given the data-gathering tools available to 
federal authorities coupled with the lack of judicial oversight, in their 
haste, federal officials could actualize connections that are not in fact 
actual.
In the wake of the Snowden-instigated disclosures, the 
government has defended itself by claiming that information 
gathered through FISA surveillance, § 215 business-records requests, 
and NSLs is necessary to thwart incipient terrorist plots and has in 
fact “disrupted dozens of terrorist plots.”525 That claim may not 
necessarily be supportable, as “[u]pon scrutiny, however, many of 
these plots appear in fact to have been uncovered not because of the 
mass collection of our metadata but through more traditional 
surveillance of particular phone numbers or email addresses”; 
information obtained through these “targeted inquiries” could have 
been collected after securing a court order to do so.526 Moreover, it is 
523. See LARS BACKSTROM ET AL., FOUR DEGREES OF SEPARATION 12 (2012), 
available at http://arxiv.org/pdf/1111.4570v3.pdf.
524. Aziz, supra note 522, at 430-31.
525. Kenneth Roth, Rethinking Surveillance, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (July 2, 2013, 
11:17 AM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/jul/02/electronic-
surveillance-missing-laws/.
526. Id. Roth, a former federal prosecutor adds:
1108 Michigan State Law Review 2014:1035
unlikely that hardened terrorists will change their methods of 
communication following the Snowden revelations, given that 
Osama bin Laden and his associates were careful to leave no digital 
footprint.527
V. LESSONS LEARNED
[T]he mid-1990s [was] a transformative period for information and 
communication technology use and policy in the United States and
globally. The birth of the Internet as a commercial medium and the need to 
respond to privacy challenges created by its global and data-driven nature 
altered the political discourse about privacy protection.528
Lessons can be learned from the Snowden disclosures, with a 
business taking steps to protect the privacy of business property, 
employees, and clients. 
Wherever a business is on the range from low technology to 
high technology, it should be concerned about protecting consumer 
data and its own proprietary information from data breaches. 
Although preventing business-data breaches has been on the horizon 
for quite some time, the 2013 revelations of NSA surveillance 
highlighted the timeliness and urgency of a business taking proactive 
steps to safeguard sensitive data. In a 2013 survey of technology, 
Consider the NSA’s two most publicized cases, a plot to bomb the New 
York Stock Exchange and an effort to send money to the Somali Islamist 
group al-Shabaab. The NYSE case was said to have unraveled beginning 
with a foreign email captured from the monitoring of a foreign website; 
the al-Shabaab case was apparently discovered when someone in San 
Diego called a known terrorist number in East Africa. Neither seems to 
have depended on the mass vacuuming up of our metadata. In view of the 
weakness of these “best” cases, twenty-six senators have written to the 
National Intelligence Director asking him to “provide examples of [the 
NSA program’s] effectiveness in providing unique intelligence, if such 
examples exist.”
Id. 
527. See John Cassidy, Why Edward Snowden is a Hero, NEW YORKER (June 
10, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2013/06/why-
edward-snowden-is-a-hero.html. “Conceivably, the fact that Uncle Sam is watching 
their Facebook and Google accounts could come as news to some dimwit would-be 
jihadis in foreign locales, prompting them to communicate in ways that are harder 
for the N.S.A. to track.” Id. In contrast, “it will hardly surprise the organized 
terrorist groups, which already go to great lengths to avoid being monitored. Not for 
nothing did Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad go without a phone or 
Internet connection.” Id.
528. Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books 
and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 280 (2011).
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directors and chief technology officers of some of the country’s 
largest law firms “say they are more concerned about security threats 
now than they were two years ago. An array of factors, the chiefs 
say, are driving the heightened focus: tougher regulatory 
requirements, more security-conscious clients, and the more 
sophisticated techniques used by cyber-criminals, who are 
increasingly targeting law firms.”529 The following sections provide 
information on data breaches, business security planning, the role of 
the chief privacy officer, safeguards to take with employees, and 
other proactive steps.
A. Data Breaches
A business cannot chart a successful plan to defend itself 
against data breaches without learning more about data breaches that 
have been reported, with a 2013 report from Verizon providing a 
fairly comprehensive snapshot of data breaches worldwide.530 The 
report states that “motive correlates very highly with country of 
origin,” and “[t]he majority of financially motivated incidents 
involved actors in either the U.S. or Eastern European countries (e.g., 
Romania, Bulgaria, and the Russian Federation). 96% of espionage 
cases were attributed to threat actors in China and the remaining 4% 
were unknown.”531 Financial gain was the motive in 75% of the 
breaches, while 19% of the breaches were caused by state-affiliated 
actors, perhaps with an espionage motive in mind.532
Of the breaches, 25% were “targeted,” meaning that the 
business was selected to be a potential target and then the perpetrator 
studied the business to identify weakness in technology that could be 
exploited; the remaining 75% of the breaches were “opportunistic,” 
529. Alan Cohen, 2013 Am Law Tech Survey: Firms’ Data Security Fears 
Rise, AM. LAW. (Nov. 10, 2013), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=
1202473327555?slreturn=20140112124252.
530. VERIZON, 2013 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT (2013), 
available at http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-
investigations-report-2013_en_xg.pdf. The report was successful in associating 
around 75% of the breaches with the particular country of the forty countries in 
which the breaches were discovered. Id. at 21. 
531. Id.
532. Id. at 5, 6. In the report, “espionage” was defined as “state-sponsored or 
affiliated actors seeking classified information, trade secrets, and intellectual 
property in order to gain national, strategic, or competitive advantage. The only 
exception is when it is used for internal actors, where it refers to industrial espionage 
perpetrated by the employees of the victim.” Id. at 11 n.9.
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meaning that the perpetrator took advantage of a weakness in 
technology.533 “[S]ome organizations will be a target regardless of 
what they do, but most become a target because of what they do (or 
don’t do).”534 Law firms may be a type of business vulnerable to 
targeted attacks, with one FBI agent commenting, “‘Law firms are 
often targeted [since] they store information on clients’ pending 
deals and litigation.’”535 It is interesting to note that the breakdown of 
targeted breaches versus opportunistic breaches differed little when 
considering the size of the business that experienced the breach. 
Small business experienced 26% of the breaches as targeted and 74% 
as opportunistic, while large businesses experienced 27% of the 
breaches as targeted and 73% as opportunistic.536
There are a number of common causes of data breaches, with 
multiple causes of certain breaches.537 Fifty-two percent of the 
breaches were attributed to hacking,538 40% to malware,539 35% to 
physical threats,540 29% to social engineering,541 13% to misuse,542
533. Id. at 48.
534. Id. at 48.
535. Cohen, supra note 529 (quoting Austin Berglas).
536. VERIZON, supra note 530, at 48.
537. Id. at 25, 26.
538. Id. at 34. “Hacking includes all attempts to intentionally access or harm 
information assets without (or in excess of) authorization by circumventing or 
thwarting logical security mechanisms.” Id.
539. Id. at 29. “Malware is any malicious software, script, or code added to 
an asset that alters its state or function without permission.” Id.; see also MICROSOFT 
CORP., MICROSOFT SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REPORT (2013), available at
http://www.microsoft.com/security/sir/default.aspx. Lower-level employees are not 
the only ones to have malware discovered on their computers. A survey of malware 
analysts reported a high incidence of malware on the computers of senior 
executives, with a mere 14% of the analysts never having had to remove malware 
from these computers. THREATTRACK SEC., MALWARE ANALYSTS HAVE THE TOOLS 
TO DEFEND AGAINST CYBER-ATTACKS, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN 2 (2013), 
available at http://www.threattracksecurity.com/resources/white-papers/cyber-
attacks-internal-challenges-malware-analysts-face.aspx. The source of the malware 
on senior executives’ computers ranged from clicking a link in a phishing email 
(56%); to attaching an infected device, such as a USB drive or smartphone (47%); to 
a family member using a business device (45%); to accessing an infected 
pornographic site (approximately 40%). Id.
540. VERIZON, supra note 530, at 40. “Physical threats encompass deliberate 
actions that involve proximity, possession, or force.” Id.
541. Id. at 36. Many businesses constantly warn employees not to click on a 
hyperlink in an email or otherwise provide confidential information in response to 
an email. This type of email is called a “phishing” email because the sender is 
counting on human nature that some recipient will be lured into taking the “bait” and 
will provide personal information that can be used to compromise one tricked into 
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and 2% to error.543 Although the percentage of data breaches 
attributed to social engineering was lower than those attributed to 
other factors, many would say that data breach incursions caused by 
a perpetrator tricking a business employee are the key to many 
incursions. “Targeted attacks can be particularly hard to defend 
against because they often exploit the weakest link in any security 
net: the humans sitting in front of the computers.”544
The Verizon report examined the level of difficulty involved in 
the initial data breach of a business and follow-up breaches of the 
same business.545 A high percentage of the initial breaches (78%) 
were of very low or low difficulty, with the rest of moderate 
difficulty (22%) and less than 1% of high difficulty.546 In a follow-up
breach of the same business, nearly the same percent (73%) were of 
very low or low difficulty, with the rest of moderate difficulty (7%) 
or high difficulty (21%).547 Other factors tabulated were the length of 
time between the data breach and its discovery, and the person who 
discovered the breach.548 Reviewing 2012 information, a large 
number of the data breaches (66%) were not discovered until months 
or more following the initial breach, with a high percentage (70%) of 
the data breaches discovered by someone outside the business, such 
providing personal information. GREG AARON, ANTI-PHISHING WORKING GRP.,
PHISHING ACTIVITY TRENDS REPORT 2 (2013), available at http://docs.apwg.org/
reports/apwg_trends_report_q2_2013.pdf. Phishing is included as one type of social 
engineering that relies on the trust of the victim to in some way compromise the 
victim or the victim’s business. VERIZON, supra note 530, at 36. Multiple attempts at 
social engineering may ultimately provide the desired result:
Running a campaign with just three e-mails gives the attacker a better than 
50% chance of getting at least one click. Run that campaign twice and that 
probability goes up to 80%, and sending 10 phishing e-mails approaches 
the point where most attackers would be able to slap a “guaranteed” 
sticker on getting a click. To add some urgency to this, about half of the 
clicks occur within 12 hours of the phishing e-mail being sent.
Id. at 38; see also AARON, supra.
542. VERIZON, supra note 530, at 38. Misuse is “[w]hen privileged parties 
maliciously or inappropriately use organizational resources in ways they should 
not.” Id.
543. Id. at 41. “We record an error as a threat action only if it deviates from 
normal processes within an organization and directly causes or significantly 
contributes to the incident.” Id.
544. Cohen, supra note 529.
545. VERIZON, supra note 530, at 49.
546. Id.
547. VERIZON, supra note 530, at 49. The Verizon report comments, “Would 
you fire a guided missile at an unlocked screen door?” Id.
548. Id. at 52-54.
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as third parties, auditors, customers, and law enforcement 
personnel.549
B. Business-Security Planning
Business planning appropriately undertaken may prevent or 
lessen damage from a data breach; basic business-planning measures 
should include the business adopting both a privacy policy and a 
crisis-management plan.
The business-privacy policy should be inclusive and tailored as 
to the nature of the business, technology used in the business (both 
software and hardware), business confidential and proprietary 
information, acceptable use of business property by employees and
others interacting with the business, and business location. It is vital 
to review and update the privacy policy so as to cover any changes in 
these factors.550
As part of developing and updating the privacy policy, the 
business should inventory its confidential and proprietary data as 
well as its electronic devices and software, with care taken to 
ascertain that the data is appropriately secured and devices and 
software are appropriately current and secured. “‘Organizations who 
do not protect their “crown jewels,” or proprietary information, and 
segregate it from any external facing network, run the risk of having 
this important information stolen during a cyber attack.’”551 Securing 
business assets normally involves seeking the advice of a security 
professional who, at a minimum, will recommend use of strong 
passwords, firewalls, virtual private networks, encryption, and anti-
malware software.552 One such professional stated, “‘Any data-
549. Id.
550. See City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010). In this case, the 
city police department issued members of its SWAT team pagers in 2001 without 
updating the 2000 city computer policy to specifically cover the pagers. Id. at 750-
51. The computer policy arguably applied to the texting capability of the pagers, and 
the SWAT team members were informed in 2002 meeting that the computer policy 
applied to the pagers, with this information provided in a follow-up memorandum; 
even so, a department lieutenant’s later statement conflicted with the written 
memorandum. Id. at 751-52. Thus, one question before the United States Supreme 
Court was whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text 
messages, given that the pagers were acquired subsequent to the computer policy, 
and there were conflicting facts as to whether the computer policy applied to the 
pagers. Id. at 758.
551. Cohen, supra note 529 (quoting Austin Berglas).
552. Illena Armstrong, Preparing for the New Norm: 2013 Guarding Against 
a Data Breach Survey, SC MAG., Mar. 2013, at 24, 27.
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centric approach must incorporate encryption, [cryptographic] key 
management, strong access controls and file monitoring to protect 
data in physical data centers, virtual and public clouds, and provide 
the requisite level of security.’”553 The professional added, “‘Today, 
it is table stakes to ‘firewall the data’. By implementing a layered 
approach that includes these critical elements, organizations can 
improve their security posture more effectively and efficiently than 
by focusing exclusively on traditional network-centric security 
methods.’”554
One trend is the employer allowing or even requiring 
employees to use their own mobile devices for business purposes. 
One 2013 chief information officer survey showed an expectation 
that 38% of businesses will end providing mobile devices to 
employees by 2016, and by 2017, 50% of businesses will expect 
employees to provide mobile devices for business purposes.555 While 
cutting business costs to the employer, this trend of employee-
provided devices must be considered in developing the business 
privacy policy. The business must monitor the business information 
accessible on the devices and must audit the security of the devices 
to guard against data breaches by unauthorized outsiders or 
inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information by mobile device 
users.556 The business privacy policy should clearly define ownership 
of information accessible on employee mobile devices, taking into 
account the vulnerability of the information to discovery requests.557
Employees must be trained in the acceptable treatment of business 
information accessible via employee-owned mobile devices.558
One factor brought to light in the Snowden revelations was the 
location in which business data is stored and the advisability of cloud 
computing.559 “It is important to reiterate that jurisdiction still 
matters. Where the infrastructure underpinning cloud computing 
(i.e., data centers) is located, and the legal framework that cloud 
553. Id. at 27 (quoting Tina Stewart).
554. Id. (quoting Tina Stewart).
555. Fabio E. Marino & Teri H.P. Nguyen, Perils of the ‘Bring Your Own 
Device’ Workplace: Relying on Employees to Furnish Their Own Smartphones and 
Tablets Makes It Tricky to Control Data, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 18, 2013, at 12.
556. See id.
557. See id. at 13.
558. Id.
559. Maija Palmer, Cyber Security: Privacy Experts Profit from Prism 
Uproar, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2013, 11:47 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/0/742baacc-25f7-11e3-8ef6-00144feab7de.html#axzz3HMixSwGZ.
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service providers are subject to, are key issues.”560 Some businesses 
may choose an alternative to cloud computing for all business 
information, eschewing remote storage of business data for 
traditional on-site storage. Another solution to the cloud computing 
dilemma is to store the sensitive information most crucial to the 
business on-site, while continuing with cloud computing for the rest 
of the business data.561 Businesses worldwide are considering the 
advantages and disadvantages of cloud storage of business data,562
with an estimated 10% to 20% of cloud customers located outside 
the United States diverting their business to clouds not run by United 
States cloud providers.563
It is wise for a business to both prevent a data breach and to 
deal with a data breach, should the need arise by developing an 
information-technology-crisis-management plan. The business’s IT-
crisis-management plan might include the following elements:
1. Damage Assessment- How you intend to ascertain exactly 
what has happened.
2. Public Relations- How you intend to respond (since 
timeliness is critical).
3. Need for Outside assistance- Who is needed to assist you 
with this highly technical problem.
560. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
561. A 2013 law firm survey showed that many law firms split firm data 
between cloud storage and on-site storage:
While more than two-thirds of responding firms (69 percent) are using 
hosted solutions in some fashion, few are trusting them with their most 
sensitive information. Just 12 percent use the cloud for storage, and a mere 
5 percent use it for document management (numbers that were close to last 
year’s results). Where are firms using the cloud? E-discovery and 
litigation support (with 62 percent of responding firms) and human 
resources (56 percent) were the most common uses.
Cohen, supra note 529.
562. For example, law firm Chief Information Officers expressed client 
concern with the law firm storing information on a cloud maintained by a company 
outside the law firm: 
“The cloud isn’t just magic and smoke; data is in a physical location, 
highly secured, with redundant backups. But law firms want to be able to 
say that the data a client entrusted to it is on their server, in their office—
not on a server they can’t even tell you where it is. They just can’t get 
comfortable with that.”
Id. (quoting Brett Burney). An option might be a private cloud over which the 
business does maintain control.
563. Palmer, supra note 559.
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4. Resources needed to cure defects that allowed this breach to 
happen.
5. How you intend to monitor & prevent future 
reoccurrences.564
In developing the IT-crisis-management plan, the business might 
find it requires business personnel on-site who are trained to function 
as an Incident Response Team (IRT).565 The goals of the IRT are “to 
identify, react to and remediate cyber-attacks launched against their 
network.”566
In this digital age, especially following the Snowden 
disclosures, sophisticated potential customers may question a 
business about its privacy policy and IT crisis-management plan. 
Law firms, among other businesses, are receiving this inquiry. A law 
firm chief information officer stated, “‘We’ll get requests about our 
response plan in the event of a cyber-breach[.] . . . So [now] we have 
a cyber-response plan.’”567
One measure increasingly taken by a number of businesses is to 
undergo “penetration testing.”568 Penetration testing involves the 
business employing a consultant or a team inside the business to run 
a mock data breach “to break in and steal data, and home in on any 
[technology] weaknesses.”569 One chief technology officer for a 
major law firm commented that the firm formerly staged a 
penetration testing “every year or two” but now is “‘doing it very 
religiously every year.’”570
As part of the IT-crisis-management plan, a business may 
consider the likelihood of advanced persistent threats (APT).571
These are “highly targeted, long-term, international espionage and 
sabotage campaigns by covert state actors.”572 APTs are thought of as 
564. Lawrence J. Trautman, Jason Triche & James C. Wetherbe, Corporate 
Information Technology Governance Under Fire, 8 J. STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD.
105, 110 (2013).
565. THREATTRACK SEC., supra note 539, at 2.
566. Id. Of the malware analysts participating in the October 2013 
ThreatTrack Security survey, 86.5% worked for a business with an IRT in place. Id.
567. Cohen, supra note 529 (quoting Lisa Mayo).
568. Id.
569. Id.
570. Id. (quoting Laurence Liss).
571. SYMANTEC CORP., ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREATS: A SYMANTEC 
PERSPECTIVE 1 (2011), available at http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/
enterprise/white_papers/b-advanced_persistent_threats_WP_21215957.en-us.pdf.
572. Id.
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occurring in four stages: “incursion, discovery, capture, and 
exfiltration.”573 Incursion is the stage during which the perpetrator 
enters through a break in the business electronic network, with social 
engineering being a likely avenue to access.574 Discovery is the stage 
during which the perpetrator inventories the network to determine 
information to be taken and the most fruitful manner of attack.575
Capture is the stage, perhaps fairly lengthy, during which the 
perpetrator robs targeted data.576 Exfiltration is the stage during 
which the perpetrator removes the data from the business.577
The IT-crisis-management plan may encompass a kill-chain 
approach to security, especially for a business likely to experience an 
APT. The kill-chain-security approach is borrowed from the military 
kill chain, the idea being that an attack occurs in stages and can be 
thwarted if blocked at any stage.578 The idea of successive stages in 
an operation can be understood by considering “a stereotypical 
burglary—the thief will perform reconnaissance on a building before 
trying to infiltrate it, and then go through several more steps before 
actually making off with the loot.”579 The goal of the kill-chain 
approach is to thwart a data breach at as early a stage as possible so 
as to minimize damage and obviate as much of the time and expense 
to repair the damage as possible.580 Though proven to be very 
effective, the kill-chain approach to security is intensive as to the 
time and cost needed to implement it. These expenses make the kill-
chain approach more likely to be implemented by the business 
known to be or strongly suspected to be a target of a cyber-attack 
because of the significant investment in bringing it to fruition. 
“Using the Cyber Kill Chain to keep attackers from stealthily 
entering your network requires quite a bit of intelligence and 
visibility into what’s happening in your network. You need to know 
573. Id. at 2.
574. Id. at 2-3.
575. Id. at 4.
576. Id. at 5.
577. Id. at 6.
578. Lysa Myers, The Practicality of the Cyber Kill Chain Approach to 
Security, CSO (Oct. 4, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/
740970/the-practicality-of-the-cyber-kill-chain-approach-to-security?page=1.
579. Id.
580. Id. The author comments, “If you don’t stop the attack until it’s already 
in your network, you’ll have to fix those machines and do a whole lot of forensics 
work to find out what information they’ve made off with.” Id.
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when something is there that shouldn’t be, so you can set the alarms 
to thwart the attack.”581
C. Chief Privacy Officer
A vital tool in the arsenal of many leading businesses is the 
professionalization of the role of the chief privacy officer (sometimes 
referred to as the chief security officer or chief technology officer) 
heading up a privacy office within the business.582 Other businesses 
may entrust this role to a privacy consultant. Leading businesses 
have recognized that the prevalence of technology vital to business 
has “required the implementation of privacy practices that were 
dynamic and forward-looking” with those businesses taking “a harm-
avoidance approach” in safeguarding the continued trust of business 
stakeholders.583
Privacy practices have become integral to doing business. 
Thus, “privacy within the firm has moved out of the closet and 
become a strategic concern” of doing business.584 One measure of the 
importance of business privacy is the addition of a chief privacy 
officer as an officer near the top of the corporate ladder.585 The role 
of the chief privacy officer is “‘to take a much more forward look’ 
aimed at identifying ‘solutions that we could think about to develop 
that are not even on perhaps the drawing board right now.’”586
Privacy professionals internal to the business are often 
supplemented by consultants who undertake the tasks of conducting 
privacy audits and ensuring compliance with business privacy 
policies.587 Current business strategies include preventing data
breaches of business proprietary and confidential information and, in 
so doing, garnering the continued trust of the business customer.588
“Privacy . . . has evolved over the last several years to be defined in 
581. Id.
582. Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 528, at 252, 273, 279.
583. Id. at 269. The survey highlighted “identifying consumer expectations 
as a touchstone for developing corporate privacy practices beyond strict regulatory 
compliance.” Id. at 270.
584. Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, New Governance, Chief 
Privacy Officers, and the Corporate Management of Information Privacy in the 
United States: An Initial Inquiry, 33 LAW & POL’Y 477, 504 (2011).
585. Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 528, at 251-52, 262.
586. Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 584, at 490 (quoting CPO 
respondents).
587. Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 528, at 262-63.
588. Id. at 252.
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large part by respect for what consumers expect regarding the 
treatment of their personal sphere.”589
The role of the chief privacy officer must be outward looking 
as well as inward looking. “Faced with uncertainty as to external 
demands on the firm resulting from the interplay between norms, 
technical and business changes, and flexible regulatory authority, 
they spend up to half of their time interacting with external 
stakeholders including regulators, advocates, and professional 
peers.”590 The chief privacy officer must gauge factors outside the 
business that have an effect on privacy within the business and, at the 
same time, must ensure compliance with the business privacy 
practices.591
In certain respects, the chief privacy officer, members of the 
media pressing privacy concerns, and other organizations and 
individuals advocating an increased emphasis on privacy have 
formed a “‘privacy community’” that has “pressed privacy as an 
issue.”592 It stands to reason that the increasing frequency with which 
privacy issues are reflected in the financial news and the manner in 
which technology is increasingly integral to doing business place 
additional pressure on the top corporate officers to emphasize 
privacy implementation within the business.593 Even if privacy was 
not consistently one of the agenda items prior to June 2013, privacy 
has since been at the top of the agenda for many meetings of 
corporate executives.594
Networking on privacy concerns plays a vital role in dealing 
with safeguarding privacy in the face of rapidly emerging 
technology, with networking occurring among privacy professionals 
and business leaders on a collegial rather than competitive basis. The 
International Association of Privacy Professionals, with over 13,000 
members in seventy-eight countries, provides one forum for such 
589. Id. at 270.
590. Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 584, at 479.
591. Id. at 489, 491, 501.
592. Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 528, at 277.
593. Id. One survey respondent noted:
[R]ight now, you see the P word all over the place. [I]t used to be like 
once a week I’d cut out an article and say, ‘Look, they’re talking about 
privacy in the paper on page twenty-two of the Wall Street Journal.’ And 
now it’s pretty much every day. So I think we’ve won the battle of 
actually being noticed.
Id.
594. See id.
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networking.595 In fact, privacy officers “reported that helping 
competitors make better privacy decisions was in their interest.”596
One privacy officer explained that “[h]elping ‘my competitor at XYZ 
Company do better,’ one described, is not ‘about competitive 
advantage.’ Rather, ‘[t]hat’s about doing the right thing because if 
they screw up . . . it screws up all of us.’”597 It benefits all to share 
strategies in the prevention, detection, and reporting of data 
breaches. One report urges a “focus on better and faster detection 
through a blend of people, processes, and technology” coupled with 
a call to “[c]ollect, analyze and share incident data to create a rich 
data source that can drive security program effectiveness.”598
A business would do well to have employees responsible for 
technology security meet with all other facets of the business on a 
regular basis to create an ongoing dialog throughout the business.599
These meetings can be used for an ongoing discussion of the 
business privacy policy and IT-crisis-management plan as well as 
providing the occasion to review the business’s continuity and 
recovery plans.600 A security consultant commented, “‘Security is not 
a department, it’s an architecture.’ . . . ‘These links are part of your 
everyday security program—an evolving part of your ability to 
respond. It’s observe, orient, decide, act. It’s a living thing.’”601
D. Employees
Internal-security compliance, as overseen by a chief privacy 
officer or outside privacy consultant, necessarily involves careful 
hiring as well as ongoing employee training to ensure that employees 
can effectively identify and handle privacy concerns that may arise. 
The 2013 Verizon report shows that insiders were involved in more 
595. About the IAPP, IAPP, https://www.privacyassociation.org/about_iapp 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2014); Andrew Clearwater & J. Trevor Hughes, In the 
Beginning . . . An Early History of the Privacy Profession, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 897, 919 
(2013). This organization provides education, certification, and networking 
opportunities for privacy professionals. IAPP Mission and Background, IAPP, 
https://privacyassociation.org/about/mission-and-background/ (last visited Nov. 6, 
2014).
596. Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 528, at 278.
597. Id.
598. VERIZON, supra note 530, at 7. 
599. Armstrong, supra note 552, at 28.
600. Id.
601. Id. (quoting Jennifer Bayuk).
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than two-thirds of reported security incidents.602 When combining 
this percentage with the high percentage (75%) of opportunistic data 
breaches and the high percentage (75%) of initial data breaches 
being of very low to low difficulty,603 there may be some reason to 
believe that proper employee training and penetration testing at 
regular intervals may pay sizable rewards in decreasing data breach 
loss. One law firm chief technology officer stated, “‘The biggest gap 
in security is people,’” and then added, “‘That’s where you are
vulnerable.’”604
An appropriate background investigation should be part of the 
employment process. Once hired, an employee should be educated to 
understand the business-privacy policy and IT-crisis-management 
plan, and should undergo training necessary to understand the 
employee’s role in carrying out business technology security, with 
the expectations tailored to the particular business.605 Standard 
security procedures may include any constraints on formulating 
secure passwords; accessing Internet sites; downloading online 
software or information; storing of sensitive information on portable 
devices; printing sensitive information; dealing with emails, email 
contents, and email attachments; allowing others to use business 
devices or access business sensitive information; using business 
devices; and accessing business proprietary or confidential 
information. 
It is good security practice for the business to categorize 
sensitive information by topic or by some other method and partition 
off the different types of sensitive information, with the network 
updated and audited on a regular basis.606 A comprehensive audit and 
review of the network by a privacy professional should alert the 
business to any “open door” in the business’s network.607 “[T]his 
open door may come in the form of insecure remote-access services 
that are public-Internet-facing and are not locked down” and “may 
602. VERIZON, supra note 530, at 20.
603. Id. at 48-49.
604. Cohen, supra note 529. Phishing attacks have evolved into “spear 
phishing,” which targets a particular organization or individual. Eric Basu, Spear 
Phishing 101 - Who Is Sending You Those Scam Emails and Why?, FORBES (Oct. 7, 
2013, 6:39 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericbasu/2013/10/07/spear-phishing-
101-who-is-sending-you-those-scam-emails-and-why. Senior management is not 
immune from phishing attacks, and “whaling” is a term coined to identify these 
phishing attacks. Id.
605. Trautman, Triche & Wetherbe, supra note 564, at 111.
606. Id.
607. Id.
Guilty by Association 1121
also be exposed through vulnerabilities in the company’s software or 
through an inexcusably weak password for a system that has been 
long forgotten.”608 Another open door may be discarded business 
devices and data not undergoing digital and physical shredding.
The business should limit physical access to each type of 
business sensitive information to the smallest number of employees 
with a need to know, with such information limited to certain 
employees, at certain times, and at a certain frequency and access 
limits reviewed and updated regularly. In addition, data flow of 
sensitive information should be analyzed to spot unusual data flow.609
Lessons are to be learned from the Snowden disclosures, one of 
which is the special role of the system analyst in contrast to the 
typical employee cleared to handle sensitive business information. 
“‘In the classified world, there is a sharp distinction between insiders 
and outsiders. If you’ve been cleared and especially if you’ve been 
polygraphed, you’re an insider and you are presumed to be 
trustworthy . . . .’”610 Thus, an NSA intelligence agent is intensively 
vetted prior to receiving a high level clearance to access classified 
material.611 Others with similar access are system analysts, members 
of the information technology staff, who have “‘godlike access to 
systems they manage,’” so as to ensure smooth running of the 
technology system.612 Because of the role played by the system 
analyst in managing data flow, a system analyst, even though lacking 
a high level clearance similar to that of an intelligence officer, may 
be a “‘super user’” having “‘root access’” to the same classified 
information.613 The privileged position of the system analyst with 
respect to the technology system may make an intelligence officer 
view a system analyst as trustworthy. 
608. Id. at 112.
609. Id.
610. Mark Hosenball & Warren Strobel, EXCLUSIVE-Snowden Persuaded 
Other NSA Workers to Give up Passwords -Sources, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2013) 
(quoting Steven Aftergood), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/exclusive-snowden-persuaded-other-nsa-workers-to-give-up-passwords--
sources/2013/11/07/6bfa9a54-4828-11e3-bf0c-cebf37c6f484_story.html.
611. Hiring Requirements, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY/CENT. SEC. SERV.,
https://www.nsa.gov/careers/jobs_search_apply/hirerequire.shtml (last visited Nov. 
6, 2014).
612. Christopher Drew & Somini Sengupta, N.S.A. Leak Puts Focus on
System Administrators, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2013) (quoting Eric Chiu),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/24/technology/nsa-leak-puts-focus-on-system-
administrators.html?_r=0.
613. Id.
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Snowden gained access to NSA material when employed by 
Dell Inc. in the spring of 2012614 and when employed by Booz Allen 
Hamilton at the NSA facility in Hawaii in the spring of 2013.615 The 
government previously had installed the anti-leak software at other 
facilities, but the narrow bandwidth at the Hawaii NSA facility was 
the reason for not installing software that could have detected 
retrieval of restricted information by an unauthorized insider.616
Aside from the software issue, Snowden’s role as a system analyst 
may have caused intelligence officers to view him with trust. 
Apparently, Snowden gained access to the usernames and passwords 
of approximately twenty to twenty-five of his co-workers after 
telling them the information was required for him to make the 
technology run smoothly.617 Another example in which the trust 
accorded Snowden worked to his favor was obtaining information on 
Bullrun, the NSA decryption program.618 NSA carefully guarded 
information on Bullrun, with analysts told, “‘Do not ask about or 
speculate on sources or methods underpinning Bullrun.’”619 Those 
cleared to a certain extent “were warned: ‘There will be no need to 
know,’”620 and agencies were warned “to be ‘selective in which 
contractors are given exposure to this information.’”621
Thus, learning from Snowden, a business would do well to 
carefully consider the special, privileged role of the system analyst 
beginning with the hiring process and continuing while the system 
analyst is on the job. When hiring, a thorough background check is 
essential, which would include an examination of any online posting. 
A business contemplating outsourcing technology staff through a 
614. Mark Hosenball, Snowden Downloaded NSA Secrets While Working for 
Dell, Sources Say, REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2013, 5:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/08/15/usa-security-snowden-dell-idUSL2N0GF11220130815.
615. John Bacon, Contractor Fires Snowden from $122,000-a-Year Job,
USA TODAY (Jun. 11, 2013, 5:36 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2013/06/11/booz-allen-snowden-fired/2411231.
616. Hosenball & Strobel, supra note 610; Mark Hosenball & Warren 
Strobel, Exclusive: NSA Delayed Anti-leak Software at Base Where Snowden 
Worked, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/18/usa-
security-snowden-software-idUKL1N0I71ZG20131018. 
617. Hosenball & Strobel, supra note 610.
618. James Ball, Julian Borger, & Glenn Greenwald, Revealed: How US and
UK Spy Agencies Defeat Internet Privacy and Security, GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-
security.
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620. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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consultant should consider that the business may have less control 
over a system analyst who is other than a direct employee.622 During 
employment, the business may scrutinize the system analyst’s 
behavior more closely and on a more continuous basis for any sign 
of disloyalty than is done with other employees, especially should 
the system analyst have access to business confidential or proprietary 
information.623 The business may decide to require the approval of 
two system analysts prior to a system analyst accessing particularly 
sensitive information.624
E. Other Proactive Steps
A technology expert claimed that NSA can take advantage of 
its “huge capabilities” to conduct surveillance of a business seen to 
be a “high-value target”; “if it wants in to your computer, it’s in.”625
Even so, there are some practical limits on the number of targets 
NSA can pursue. “The NSA has turned the fabric of the internet into 
a vast surveillance platform, but they are not magical. They’re 
limited by the same economic realities as the rest of us, and our best 
defense is to make surveillance of us as expensive as possible.”626
One strategy to avoid NSA surveillance is for the business to 
remain low profile. Tactics to surf online anonymously include using 
Tor,627 or something similar, or using a virtual private network, 
which masks the user’s computer IP address.628
Another strategy is to use encryption, both for online traffic 
and at the endpoint, perhaps taking the added precaution of 
performing endpoint encryption of sensitive data on a computer 
622. Drew & Sengupta, supra note 612.
623. Id.
624. Id.
625. Bruce Schneier, NSA Surveillance: A Guide to Staying Secure,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2013, 9:09 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain-secure-surveillance.
626. Id.
627. Id. Tor (originally “the Onion Router”) allows one to anonymously 
navigate the Internet by routing communication randomly through servers located in 
various parts of the world. Lee, supra note 382. For a description of how Tor works, 
see Geier, supra note 384.
628. Jon Matonis, 5 Essential Privacy Tools for the Next Crypto War,
FORBES (July 19, 2012, 10:47 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/
2012/07/19/5-essential-privacy-tools-for-the-next-crypto-war/. Virtual private 
networks are sometimes used to link computers within a particular business; 
however, they can also be used to create a secure encrypted tunnel through the 
Internet. See Geier, supra note 384.
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separated by an air gap from a computer network.629 Encryption can 
extend to emails, stored data, telephone conversations over the 
Internet, and online chat or instant messaging.630 Snowden stated in 
an interview, “‘Encryption works. Properly implemented strong 
crypto systems are one of the few things that you can rely on.’”631
With NSA reportedly having access to many commercial software 
programs, it may be wise to use open-source software and public-
domain encryption.632
Care should be taken to secure the endpoint of communication, 
the user’s computer, software, and network, as this may be the weak 
link in the communication chain.633 Snowden stated, “‘Unfortunately, 
endpoint security is so terrifically weak that NSA can frequently find 
ways around it.’”634 Accessing communication through the endpoint 
may be far easier than breaking encryption.635
In addition to protecting the endpoints, the links between 
networks must also be secured. For example, NSA found weak spots 
in the cables linking Google and Yahoo data centers.636 “Those data 
centers are kept highly secure using heat-sensitive cameras and 
biometric authentication, and companies believed the data flowing 
among centers was secure.”637 Even so, “Google . . . began the 
process of encrypting this internal traffic before reports of N.S.A. 
spying leaked during the summer, and accelerated the effort since 
then.”638 The chief attorney for Google stated, “‘We have long been 
concerned about the possibility of this kind of snooping, which is 
why we have continued to extend encryption across more and more 
Google services and links.’”639 The attorney added, “‘We are 
outraged at the lengths to which the government seems to have gone 
629. See Schneier, supra note 625.
630. Id.
631. Id. (quoting Edward Snowden).
632. Id. The choice of the encryption method used is crucial as indicated by 
the following comment of Ladar Levison: “‘Without Congressional action or a 
strong judicial precedent’ . . . ‘I would strongly recommend against anyone trusting 
their private data to a company with physical ties to the United States.’” Perlroth, 
Larson & Shane, supra note 345 (quoting Ladar Levison).
633. Schneier, supra note 625.
634. Id. (quoting Edward Snowden).
635. See id.
636. Savage, Miller & Perlroth, supra note 71.
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to intercept data from our private fiber networks, and it underscores 
the need for urgent reform.’”640
One idea discussed by some countries and regions since the 
Snowden disclosures is to imitate China’s electronic “great firewall” 
that partitions electronic communications within the country from 
those taking place elsewhere in the world.641 One example of this is 
Brazil, which proposes to contain communication in the local area 
and to establish a secure email system within the country.642 The 
reason to restrict an electronic communication to a particular 
geographic area is to have control over the legal environment 
through which the communication travels. In contrast, the benefits of 
unrestricted global online communication have been to promote 
worldwide communication and technological innovation; 
“Balkanization” of worldwide communication may slow these 
benefits.643 Partitioning communication in this way may also be 
expensive, as it may be necessary to set up regional data centers and 
networks.644
The discussion of communicating on a network separated from 
the worldwide one has led to some communities establishing 
alternative private mesh networks.645 A mesh network is comprised 
of numerous nodes, with each wireless radio node programmed to 
work with the other nodes in the network.646 In certain circumstances, 
a community established a mesh network after waiting a 
considerable length of time for a commercial provider to bridge the 
“last mile” to the community from the Internet backbone.647 Over 
time, some mesh networks have grown to a considerable size, with 
the Athens Wireless Metropolitan Network having more than 1,000 
640. Id. (quoting David Drummond).
641. Ian Brown, Will NSA Revelations Lead to the Balkanisation of the 
Internet?, GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013, 2:05 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/01/nsa-revelations-balkanisation-
internet.
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MOTHER JONES, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/08/mesh-internet-
privacy-nsa-isp (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
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members and the Guifi Spanish network having more than 21,000 
members.648
Other than being attractive to an under-served community, a 
mesh network might be used by one who wishes to escape 
persecution by a repressive regime or avoid NSA surveillance.649
New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute developed 
Commotion, “internet in a suitcase” software.650 Commotion enables 
one to set up private mesh network that remains secure.651 A
Commotion mesh network would remain secure as long as its 
encryption remains unbroken and the mesh network remains separate 
from the Internet.652
Another technology being explored is quantum cryptography 
using fiber optic cables and quantum servers.653 An advantage of 
quantum cryptography is that a communication breach is easily 
detected because a breach would alter the light stream carrying the 
communication.654 The disadvantage is the hardware required: a fiber 
optic cable flanked by a secure node on either end, making quantum 
cryptography best used at this point for internal communication.655
Another proactive option is for the business to take a political 
stand supporting a push in Congress to protect communication 
privacy by reining in NSA activities and requiring effective oversight 
of NSA activities.656 Political activity encompasses a whole range of 
options from writing letters to elected officials, to meeting with 
elected officials, to becoming active in a political action committee, 
to becoming a campaign contributor, to contributing to a campaign 
of an incumbent challenger.657
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CONCLUSION
Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told 
by any single visit, as does one’s not visiting any of these places over the 
course of a month. The sequence of a person’s movements can reveal still 
more; a single trip to a gynecologist’s office tells little about a woman, but 
that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a 
different story. A person who knows all of another’s travels can deduce 
whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, 
an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an 
associate of particular individuals or political groups—and not just one 
such fact about a person, but all such facts.658
Americans’ civil liberties and America’s security have long 
presented polar values coexisting sometimes in harmony and 
sometimes in discord. Since 9/11, the imbalance of their 
dichotomous existence has been extremely controversial, resting on 
the far end of discord.659 Business concerns have in many ways found 
themselves in the unenviable middle. Because businesses are private 
in nature, as opposed to a public or governmental entity, and not an 
individual, per se, they are left outside many constitutional 
protections.660 Further, the federal domestic-surveillance tools 
enacted since 9/11 leave precious little room for challenge.661
Congress may need to weigh in to require the federal government to 
disclose information on a regular schedule to help restore public 
confidence. Other veterans in the intelligence community say only an 
independent arbiter, like Congress or the courts, can balance the need to 
protect legitimate secrets against the public’s right to know.662
Consequently, tens of thousands of American businesses have 
been recipients or targets of the government’s intelligence gathering 
efforts with numerous negative consequences. Hundreds of 
thousands of their clients and customers have unknowingly had 
information disclosed through FISA surreptitious surveillance 
practices, § 215 business-records requests, and § 505 NSLs.663 These 
clients and customers about whom information is sought may enjoy 
constitutional protections and the mechanism to lodge objections but 
658. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (footnote 
omitted) (adopting the mosaic theory), aff’d in part sub nom. United States v. Jones, 
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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660. See supra Part IV.
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not the knowledge that their information has been disclosed. This 
essentially allows authorities to avoid bothersome challenges. Armed 
with unimaginable volumes of data, federal authorities possess 
necessary information to map and monitor Americans’ social 
networks, webs of friends, acquaintances, and others about which the 
networks’ members lack information required for their own 
familiarity. Now, this information is available not only for use in 
national-security prosecutions to prevent further terrorist attacks, but 
also in ordinary, everyday criminal prosecutions very much 
accountable to the U.S. Constitution. Further examination and review 
is needed to fully understand the magnitude of the small-world 
implications for big-world consequences in post-9/11 America.
